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INTRODUCTION
Politics can be deeply personal, and its practice need not, of
course, be electoral. The practice of identity politics in the workplace
is not novel, manifesting itself both in individual antidiscrimination
1
claims and even in the collective bargaining context. In the public
sector, the practice of identity politics often merges with politics in its
purest sense, as workers’ speech receives First Amendment protection
from employer sanction only if it is “commenting upon matters of
2
3
public concern” and not merely a personal grievance.
The
constraints of First Amendment protection invite the practice of
identity politics by proxy, in which the patina of a larger societal issue
4
is the vehicle by which differences among workers are expressed.
Identity politics in the workplace coexists uneasily with a legal
regime of non-discrimination, for its practice may render a worker of

1. See Molly McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Union: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1350–51 (1997) (discussing the tension between an
individual rights model of workplace equality and unionism and noting that “federal
law effectively encouraged employees to define their grievances at the workplace,
and to organize themselves, through reference to personal or group identity rather
than through a union”).
2. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
3. Id. at 146–48.
4. Scholars have focused on race discrimination by proxy, in which employers
utilize characteristics highly correlated with race as a basis for adverse job actions
against applicants. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other
Name?: On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and
Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1288–89 (2005) (exploring the effect of being
perceived as a member of a certain racial group on a person’s hiring or promotion
prospects). This use of the proxy concept is distinct from my construct: this Article
is concerned with identity-based speech rather than status discrimination and with
constitutional protections against retaliation for such speech rather than
discrimination.
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color more susceptible to discrimination. If we accept the legal and
cognitive psychology literature that demonstrates that prejudice
against racial minorities emanates from latent attitudes learned and
6
reinforced over time, consider the relative potency of these cues for
latent prejudice: a White supervisor who works with a Black, versus a
White supervisor who works with a Black whom she overhears
7
implying that President Ronald Reagan was a racist. The Black
employee in the latter example draws attention to her race, to her
social inequality, in a manner that potentiates a more instant and
perhaps visceral cuing of latent prejudices. To place matters in a
contemporary context, consider the recent verbal gaffe by Senator
Joseph Biden in describing Democratic presidential primary
opponent Barack Obama, who is Black. Biden said of Obama: he is
“the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright
8
and clean and a nice-looking guy.”
Setting to one side the
stereotypical antithesis of Blacks as inarticulate, not bright, dirty, and
ugly that Biden’s description inadvertently underscores, the
statement also suggests the parameters of acceptable Black candidates
for White Americans. Shirley Chisholm, Jesse Jackson, and Al
Sharpton were not mainstream candidates because each of their
candidacies was strongly identified with their racial group, Blacks. As
with candidates, when workers of color speak from a vantage point
that is strongly identified with their racial background, their speech
places them outside the mainstream of the White employment
environment.
Public employees enjoy free speech rights not enjoyed by private
9
sector workers. This disparity creates greater potential for “voice” to

5. See Fadi Hanna, Gay Self-Identification and the Right to Political Legibility, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 75, 76 (2006) (“[S]elf-identifying speech, because it makes us susceptible
to discrimination, is often the first casualty of that discrimination.”).
6. See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (surveying academic literature
on unconscious racial stereotyping and bias).
7. See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (using cognitive psychology to
analyze a White employer’s reaction to a Black employee who made comments
suggesting that Reagan was a racist).
8. Dan Balz, Biden Stumbles at the Starting Gate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A6.
9. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 739 (Idaho 2003)
(“[A]n employee does not have a cause of action against a private sector employer
who terminates the employee because of the exercise of the employee’s
constitutional right of free speech.”). But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Although Novosel is not a government employee, the
public employee cases do not confine themselves to the narrow question of state
action. Rather, these cases suggest that an important public policy is in fact
implicated wherever the power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of
employee political activities [i.e., speech].”). Most courts have rejected Novosel’s
extension of free speech rights to private sector employees. See Grinzi v. San Diego
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become both a vehicle by which identity politics is practiced as well as
an instigator of the process by which employees are racialized. To
racialize or “race” a person or his speech is to bring to bear the
dominant social position of the listener and the unequal social
10
position of the speaker in assessing the legitimacy of the speech.
Racialization is a process, a type of racial profiling that permutates
itself in relation to the racial category of its object and the cultural
11
understandings attendant to that category.
Critically, however,
racialization can occur not only when workers of color consciously
employ speech on matters of public concern in the practice of
identity politics, but rather whenever these workers address a topic
and express a viewpoint that is associated with their social
subordination. Whether intended as an act of identity politics or not,
such expressions collide with the dominant social norms of the White
workplace. These norms, which are both implicit and explicit in
character, are imported from external society into the workplace and
12
reflect majoritarian hegemony. The stigmatization engendered by
such speech reflects an economy of racialization, in which some
norm-violational conduct is more acceptable than others, depending
on the degree to which the conduct at issue is raced. I do not invoke
the term economy to mean bartering of any sort but rather to
describe a structure by which the liabilities of racialization are meted
Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing numerous cases
in which the court has refused to adopt, or expressed disapproval of, Novosel).
10. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the
United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 904 n.4 (2003) (discussing the process by which
individuals are “raced” by Whites in order to resist equality-enhancing benefits, such
as affirmative action); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 443 n.52 (1990) (citing Comments of
Kendall Thomas at the Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of
Legal Thought, Duke Law School, Jan. 26, 1990) (noting with approval Professor
Thomas’s assertion that individuals are “raced” through millions of ongoing
contemporaneous speech/acts).
11. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen
Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000) (asserting that the racialization process,
in the context of its application to Chinese Americans, is based upon a stereotype
that the Chinese are unable and unwilling to assimilate into American society).
12. See Gerald R. Ferris et al., Reactions of Diverse Groups to Politics in the Workplace,
22 J. MGMT. 23, 27 (1996) (“The dominant group in an organization at any given
time tends to establish the general tone for all other groups. Because Caucasian
males typically represent the majority, and indeed, the dominant coalition in most
organizations, they tend to be the ones selected as ‘insiders’; that is, the ones taught
to hone their political skills and perfect their craft.”); Alex Geisinger, Are Norms
Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57
ALA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (“Norms arise only because rational individuals attain
benefits from interacting with others and thus value the acceptance of others.
Individuals attempt to determine the majority preference, and the failure to act in
accordance with the view of the majority negatively impacts one’s perceived
attractiveness to other group members.”).
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out.
For instance, as suggested heretofore, race is often more
threatening to Whites when it talks back to them than when it merely
14
exists among them. Within the economy, or along the continuum,
of racialization, then, such conduct may more readily engender in a
listener’s mind an association between the employee of color and his
15
social inequality.
The vitality of First Amendment protection
afforded the expression of speech by those most likely to be
victimized by the economy of racialization is the focus of this Article.
The implications of the First Amendment’s protection of normviolational speech by people of color for the norm-violational
conduct of broad classes of socially unequal employees are a
concomitant concern. Finally, this Article probes the reciprocal
implications of speech constraints in the public and private sectors.
In Part I, after setting forth an autobiographical narrative that
maps many of the social inequities of minority racializable speech, I
traverse the continuum of racialization by examining a recent
Supreme Court case in which a Latino assistant district attorney’s
16
speech had no apparent racial overtones, Garcetti v. Ceballos. Garcetti
arguably represents the low ebb of racialization while illustrating how
race-imbued social predispositions can nevertheless influence an
17
employer’s reaction to employee speech. Rankin v. McPherson, an
earlier Supreme Court case, locates a different point in the economy
of racialization, one where the racial cast of the speech is
unmistakable but where we lack sufficient information to know
whether the speaker intended to hold herself out as an active
practitioner of identity politics. Occupying an uncertain space in
between Rankin and the archetype of racialization is the controversy
surrounding University of Colorado Professor Ward Churchill.
13. An economy in this respect means “[a]n orderly, functional arrangement of
parts; an organized system.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 583 (3d ed. 1996).
14. Cf. Davis v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., No. 91-CV-359E(M), 1994 WL 714517, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the terminated
plaintiff in a Title VII action must show that he was replaced by a member of a nonprotected class, for “an employer might tolerate outspokenness in his white
employees but find objectionable a comparable lack of reserve by a black employee
because of a feeling that blacks ‘should know their place’”); Coleman v. Clark Oil &
Ref. Co., 568 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (citing a Black plaintiff’s
allegation that job promotions were given to Blacks “less outspoken regarding
matters of apparent racial discrimination”).
15. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1997) (defining the “political economy of
race” as “the processes through which race is used to distribute power and maintain
racial privilege”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1215, 1230 (2002) (referencing the role of the political economy of race in
endowing different skin colors with different social significance).
16. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
17. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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Churchill, a Native American professor, used the term “little
Eichmanns” in characterizing as enablers of American genocide the
workers who perished in the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center
18
attacks. The ensuing controversy raised confusing questions about
the authenticity of Churchill’s Native American heritage as well as
questions about Churchill’s interpretation of indigenous people’s
19
history, the resolution of which could have broad implications for
outsider scholarship and academic freedom generally. That the
controversy trained on Churchill’s heritage and his scholarship on
Native Americans—matters having no apparent relationship to his
controversial statements regarding 9/11—simultaneously illustrates
how the economy of racialization can de-value speech based on the
perceived absence of the racial bona fides of the speaker and how the
very same bona fides can be deployed to subordinate a person of
color when he behaves inconsistently with White norms. Finally, Part
20
I discusses Jeffries v. Harleston, a federal circuit case in which a Black
professor consciously exercises racial and arguably racist voice. The
21
institutional and public outcry against Jeffries, whether justified or
not, crystallized his status as a social subordinate and demonstrated a
regimen for processing the errant speech of unequals that fortifies
their inequality.
Having shown how status inequality interfaces with speech on
matters of public concern to the disadvantage of employees of color
in Part I, Part II of this Article explores the doctrinal challenges that
First Amendment jurisprudence faces in attempting to account for
the social inequality of a speaker in the employment context. I
discuss the courts’ tendencies and limited stated justifications for
applying only intermediate scrutiny to the prototype public employee
free speech claim. I then discuss the doctrinal machinations in which
plaintiffs engage in order to obtain closer scrutiny of their claim.
Finally, in order to demonstrate the full frailty of First Amendment
protection for some of the most socially vulnerable speakers, I
unpack in greater detail the inequality-reinforcing characteristics of
22
the Court’s holding in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Part III concedes that the

18. Ward Churchill, “Some People Push Back”: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/churchill.html.
19. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that the authenticity of
Churchill’s claim of Native American heritage has been challenged).
20. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), modified by 52 F.3d 9 (2d
Cir. 1995).
21. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (relating how Jeffries’s employer
classified his speech as racist and anti-Semitic).
22. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
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Supreme Court is unlikely to dash the Pickering /Connick balancing
test, under which courts effectively apply intermediate scrutiny to
employee free speech claims. I propose, however, a tactical means of
shedding greater light on the manner in which speakers’ social
subordination distorts the proper application of the First
Amendment in determining the protection speech is due. To do
this, I juxtapose Garcetti with another retaliation case from the 2005–
25
2006 term, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. I
demonstrate that although it involves statutory speech rights under
Title VII, Burlington Northern represents a competing vision about the
social meanings and effects of workplace discourse and offers
principles logically transferable to the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. I then re-litigate Garcetti under the aegis
of Burlington Northern.
I.

STORIES ABOUT RACE, “SPEECH ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC
CONCERN,” AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY
A. Talking While Black: A Narrative and a Topology

I sat in a faculty meeting some years ago during which a White
colleague urged the adoption of a faculty resolution condemning the
26
anonymous drawing of swastikas on library desks. The matter had
previously come to the attention of various faculty members as well as
the law school administration. The resolution was uncontroversial
23. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
24. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
25. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
26. My use of personal narrative, a first for me, reflects a longstanding belief in
praxis: race is a lived phenomenon, and those who write about it, regardless of their
color, ought not to be “imperial scholars,” out of touch with the very realities and
people whose plights are their subject matters. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 568
(1984) (criticizing White scholars for attempting to monopolize the area of civil
rights scholarship). Delgado claimed that a number of these scholars were not
attuned to the lives, perspectives, and aspirations of the very people about whom they
were writing. See id. (noting, for example, one author’s claims that Blacks no longer
needed heightened judicial protection because they had ceased being an insular
minority). This concern seems no less pertinent to scholars of color who write in the
area of race generally and about critical race theory in particular.
Imagine a proponent of tort reform who became a multi-millionaire by winning a
personal injury suit. Imagine an ardent opponent of a woman’s right to choose who
had an elective abortion. Imagine the opponent of affirmative action who advances
under its auspices. From these examples, it should be clear that some ideological
positions are difficult to de-personalize and, as such, fairly expose their proponents
to a challenge of personal consistency. In the context of race scholarship and critical
race theory, those who espouse progressive and critical race theory but do not live it
within their own professional or personal environs seem very much susceptible to
Delgado’s charge.
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and passed without debate, with obligatory thanks to its sponsor.
While appropriately prideful of its vote, the faculty’s actions were de
rigueur: symbolic racism, or racial insult, is a relatively facile object of
27
opprobrium for all but the racially hidebound.
Popular racial
28
discourse trains on such symbols (e.g., nooses, crosses, swastikas)
29
and words that demean (e.g., “nappy-headed ho’s” ). My colleagues’
concerns and actions were thus microcosmic.
27. At least two types of symbolic racism require distinction here. One is the type
that enables institutional discrimination by covertly and pretextually marginalizing
people of color. This type of symbolic racism recasts racial motives as “‘moral
feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism, self
reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline.’” Kevin Durrheim & John Dixon,
Attitudes in the Fiber of Everyday Life: The Discourse of Racial Evaluation and the Lived
Experience of Desegregation, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 626, 628 (2004) (quoting Donald R.
Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to
the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414, 416 (1981)). This brand of
“symbolic racism is the glue that links political conservatism to racial prejudice
among Whites in the contemporary era.” David O. Sears & P.J. Henry, The Origins of
Symbolic Racism, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 259, 264 (2003).
Swastikas, confederate flags, burning crosses, and the like may well aid and abet
institutional discrimination, but there is nothing covert about these symbols. They
are the manifestations of old-style racism driven underground by a modern “selfpresentational” norm that overt discrimination not be displayed. See Durrheim &
Dixon, supra, at 631 (asserting that individuals’ concerns about being perceived as
racist have led to “[r]acial stereotypes [that] are implied rather than explicitly
stated”). Thus, I use the term “symbolic racism” to refer to transparent artifacts of
racism, like a swastika or calling a person of color “nigger.” To be sure, these
symbols are often used to connote racial violence. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575,
631 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s reliance on the distinctive nature of cross
burning as a harbinger of racial violence in denying that activity First Amendment
protection). But racial symbolism in popular discourse is now just as often deployed
by Whites to imply an equivalency between tangible harms, such as being deprived of
political representation, and ethereal offenses, such as being harmed by the visual
appearance of a district. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 638, 642 (1993) (holding
that White plaintiffs who suffered no impairment to either the proportionality of
congressional representation from their state or to their right to freely cast a vote
were permitted to bring a constitutional claim because a newly drawn congressional
district “though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race . . . .”). I thus also use the term symbolic discrimination in contradistinction to
what are often more consequential forms of racism, such as being denied a job on
the basis of race or suffering present effects from the legacy of state-sanctioned
discrimination.
28. Following the “Jena 6” controversy, in which violence erupted at a local high
school in Louisiana after a noose was hung on a “Whites only” tree, a spate of noosehanging incidents occurred throughout the country, causing an emotional debate
about the meaning of the symbol. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, Few Answers About Nooses But
Much Talk of Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at A31 (reporting on incidents in
the New York metropolitan area); Paul Vitello, This Halloween, the Man in the Noose
Seems to Have Won a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at B1 (reporting that the
noose symbol had become so sensitive an issue around the country that the
Halloween ghoul in a noose had drawn protests).
29. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (asserting that the racist insult
employed by Don Imus pales in comparison to the effects on minorities of the
policies of politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Trent Lott).
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Many of these same colleagues, however, could not see how it was
plausible to charge the law school—and by extension, them—with
discrimination for their rejection of each of eight Black entry-level
candidates for a tenure-track position that the school had called back
over a five-year period. Indeed, one of the most resistant to this
inference was the very colleague who sponsored the motion
concerning the swastikas. My colleagues’ denials seemed particularly
strained in light of these candidates’ qualifications, which included
doctorate degrees, federal appellate clerkships, law review
memberships, and well-placed law review publications. The source of
the disparity in their reaction to the swastikas versus their failure to
hire qualified Black entry-level candidates appeared to lie in their
belief that there were neutral justifications for their hiring decisions
that insulated them from the same ignominy associated with
swastikas. My colleagues did not appreciate that racial discrimination
is most likely to take place when there is a neutral justification rather
than when the actor’s behavior clearly abridges a social norm, as did
30
the drawing of the swastikas.
Institutional racism, whose manifestations are often more
inferential than direct, does not lend itself to the convenient moral
indignation of railing against a symbol; rather it requires a higher
order of thought and an understanding of the structural
impediments to equal opportunity and their interaction with
31
individual Whites’ motives, actions, and privileges. Those who press
30. See Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination: Differential
Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 469
(2002) (“Whites’ bias against Blacks is most likely to be expressed when socially
appropriate, normative responses are less clearly defined and negative responses can
be justified on factors others [sic] than race.”); see also Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 747 (2005)
(arguing that as a consequence of the conflict between denial of personal prejudice
and latent prejudice feelings and beliefs, “discrimination is most likely to occur in
contexts where it can be justified as something other than discrimination”).
31. See John A. Powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25
LAW & INEQ. 355, 358 (2007) (comprehending racism as more than bad motives and
actions on the part of individual actors: “race, racial meanings, and racial practices
are really about all people in the United States, cultural meaning, institutional
arrangements, and their interactions. These inter-institutional actions and structures
cannot be understood by looking for a single cause.”); see also Ian F. Haney Lopez,
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J.
1717, 1728 (2000) (setting forth a theory of discrimination that neither relies solely
on the motivated actions of individuals nor ignores their relevance). Lopez states:
In this way, the term “institutional racism” functions here on both technical
and popular levels. In the technical sense, the phenomenon at issue is
institutional racism because it involves unconsidered actions rooted in the
sorts of institutions contemplated by New Institutionalism: the background
scripts and paths that mark social and organizational life. In the popular
sense, it is institutional racism because it describes activity more likely to
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a charge of institutional discrimination, as I did on behalf of the
Black law teaching candidates, are at a marked rhetorical and
political disadvantage because the depth of the victimization wrought
by institutional prejudice often cannot be abridged into a visual
representation or an epithet. Thus, rather than being hailed like my
colleague who had proposed the resolution condemning the desk
swastikas, my conduct came to be viewed as violating unspecified
32
community norms.
If all condemnation of racism is not created equally because all
racism is not equally recognized, a similar inequality applies to those
who speak about race. As an African American man who was the
most vociferous, and sometimes the lone, voice concerning questions
of minority hiring, I came to understand this acutely over the course
of fifteen years at my institution. Progressive White colleagues
perceived their antiracist obligations to be limited to voting for the
Black candidates rather than challenging the persons and structures
that conspired to defeat—and in several instances mistreat—these
33
candidates.
Untenured colleagues of color were constrained by
arise within the formally organized bodies commonly referred to as
institutions—for example, the courts.
Id. at 1727–28. Although I believe that a lack of sophistication in appreciating
institutional racism played a large role in the faculty’s behavior, I would not dismiss
White microaggression as a cohabiting explanation. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989) (describing microaggression against
Blacks as “subtle, stunning, often automatic and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put
downs’ of blacks by offenders” (quoting Chester M. Pierce et al., An Experiment in
Racism: TV Commercials, in TELEVISION & EDUCATION 62, 66 (C. Pierce ed., 1978))).
32. Whites recoil at being accused of discrimination or bigotry. See infra note 96
and accompanying text (discussing Whites’ discomfort at even the prospect of being
perceived as racist). The reaction of my colleagues thus emulated a well-traversed
flight from substance:
Minority (as well as non-minority) law professors and students who are
committed to fostering diversity and inclusion in the legal profession are
quite familiar with the ways in which resistance to exclusionary admissions,
appointments, and promotion practices is silenced. Oftentimes, this silence
is organized around discourses of “collegiality,” which cast resistance as
“uncollegial,” or through discourses of “academic freedom.”
These
discursive practices enable impunity by silencing internal criticism and
deflecting external accountability from the frequently racist and sexist
decision-making processes through which social elites reproduce their
political, institutional, and cultural dominance.
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Expanding Directions, Exploding Parameters:
Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 203, 219
(2000); see also Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t
Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999) (“Naturally, the radical voices of oppositional
thinkers who focus their concerns primarily on institutional racism are even less
likely to be heard by White society or by their moderate ‘formal equality’ allies of
color.”).
33. The reticence of progressive White colleagues, and their propensity to retreat
no sooner than their reticence was overcome, was perhaps the most frustrating
aspect of my advocacy for minority hiring. Just as these colleagues occupy a
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their status. Other colleagues of color who enjoyed the protections
of tenure appeared at least as invested in mollifying White colleagues
as they were in resisting racism. In this company, I was easily cast as a
“race man.” With this moniker came the common tropes and
34
canards of racialization, including charges of “divisiveness,”
35
36
uncollegiality, and unwarranted anger.
Free speech is perhaps never free of social costs, but these costs are
borne in different ways by speakers of different races. Were my
speech my only departure from community norms or expectations,
perhaps this narrative would be unilluminating on the subject of
workplace discourse. But I spoke the language of an outsider while
occupying the shoes of a social unequal. I was Black in a White
institution. Perhaps more importantly, I was Black and male in a
White institution. I could not help but wonder, based on their at
times irrational and apoplectic reactions to my charges of
37
discrimination in hiring, whether some colleagues heard and
privileged space in general due to their race, they also occupy a privileged position
with respect to debates about race: “It is widely acknowledged among antiracists that
Whites are taken more seriously when talking about racism than are people of color,
just as feminists know that men are taken much more seriously than are women
when they are talking about sexism.” Eileen O’Brien, Whites Doing Antiracism:
Discourse, Practice, Emotion and Organizations 104–05 (May 1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida), available at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/amg21
53/obrian_e.pdf.
34. The charge by Whites that accusing them of discrimination is divisive is a
rhetorical move whose logical extension would chill any claim of discrimination. See
Derrick Bell & Linda Singer, Commentary, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265,
266 (1993) (“The debate [regarding a claim of racism] immediately centers upon
the propriety of the accusation and the character of the accuser. The complaint is
displaced or discredited, even though we never reach its merits.”).
35. The use of collegiality standards to suppress racial dissent and marginalize
those who charge discrimination typifies the process of racialization as that term is
conceived in this Article. The encroachment on a norm of racial hierarchy need not
be great to earn the disrepute of being uncollegial. Sumi Cho, “Unwise,” “Untimely,”
and “Extreme”: Redefining Collegial Culture in the Workplace and Revaluing the Role of
Social Change, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 809–10 (2006). When the speaker is a
member of a minority group, as he often will be in the context of a charge of
discrimination, his status is liable to be deployed to devalue his speech, for modern
psychology teaches “that ‘subjective judgments of interpersonal skills and collegiality
are quite vulnerable to stereotypic biases.’” Hart, supra note 30, at 748 (quoting
Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1056 (1991)).
36. When Whites refer to a Black man as “angry,” the semantic choice is often a
nod to stereotype. See Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the
Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 568 n.225 (2003) (citing BELL
HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 18–19 (1995)) (contrasting the popular view of
Black anger as gratuitously violent with the intellectual militancy represented by
figures such as Malcolm X).
37. These reactions ranged from coercion (i.e., informing an untenured
colleague of color that she should not have voted in support of a particular motion I
made) to aggression (i.e., accosting me in a hallway with the expectation that I would
retract my positions and then labeling me arrogant when I refused to do so) to
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interpreted my speech through the prism of their privilege and my
racial inequality. I strongly suspect that they did—and continue to.
The highly publicized experiences of the litigants of color discussed
hereinafter reveal that my own experience is far from aberrational.
Justice Harry Blackmun, in a moment of judicial candor, observed
in a dissenting opinion on public employee privacy rights that “judges
are never free from the feelings of the times or those emerging from
38
their own personal lives.” Blackmun could just as easily have been
referring to any other decision-maker or even to humans generally.
He might have added that these personal influences need not be
conscious. As Professor Linda Krieger has observed in her highly
regarded application of cognitive psychology to status-based
discrimination, individuals seldom process information sui generis;
rather, they simplify it into broader categories to expedite an
39
understanding, albeit an imperfect one, of persons and events.
These cognitive processes can “result in stereotyping and other forms

provocation (i.e., publicly and confrontationally deriding my claim that race almost
certainly played a role in the rejection of eight consecutive Black entry-level
candidates) to suppression (attempting to sanction my speech). Concededly, these
are also reactions to unpopular speech made by non-minorities, but an equality of
hostile treatment can be meted out with different motives and can inflict quite
unequal injury. The social position of an employee to whom such reactions are
directed shades the cultural meaning of the exchange as well as the perceptions of
the minority employee’s responses.
People of color like me and the Black candidates on whose behalf I spoke are far
more likely to be victimized by institutional rather than symbolic discrimination. See
Lopez, supra note 31, at 1723 (contending that institutional racism “may well
constitute the greatest source of ongoing harm to minority communities”); see also
Harris, supra note 15, at 1216 n.4 (“[I]nstitutional practices are in fact the most
dominant form of reproducing racial inequality in the modern age.” (citing Lopez,
supra note 31, at 1730–48)). Yet because the former is often treated as an
unprovable abstraction, White colleagues could with impunity belittle my charges of
discrimination against Black teaching candidates. See Victor M. Goode & Conrad A.
Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing Discrimination Cases: A New Look at a Lingering
Problem, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1143, 1159 (2003) (noting that while evidence of
symbolic racism such as racial epithets and threats of violence have resulted in
rewards of damages for emotional harm in the context of housing discrimination
lawsuits, emotional harms caused by the more subtle practice of institutional racism
have been harder to prove). Moreover, my or any other minority employee’s
response to retaliatory actions of the sort enumerated here will be disadvantaged
because such actions are often consciously or unconsciously perpetrated with a view
towards eliciting a response that conforms to the stereotype the aggressor harbors of
the minority employee’s racial group. See Smith, supra note 36, at 568 n.225
(contending that any confrontational opposition to discrimination by an African
American employee is prone to being discounted as mere violent behavior because
of the stereotypical portrayal of African Americans as angry).
38. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 734 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1188–91 (1995) (explaining that to approach every new encounter or individual as a
unique experience would overwhelm the cognitive abilities of humans).
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of biased intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational
40
processes.” Once in place, stereotypes operate as a latent schema
41
for perceiving other people and information about other people.
42
No intent is necessary to summon the stereotypes into operation.
43
Indeed, a decision-maker is often unaware that he harbors them.
The processing of language is not significantly different from the
cognitive processing of people and information about people, for as
sociolinguists observe, “people may be just as ‘biased’ in the
44
interpretation of conversation or media messages.” Discourse plays
an integral role in the reproduction of societal prejudice and
discrimination. The process is symbiotic. On the one hand, the
manner in which Whites discuss minorities, both in everyday
conversation and in the media and other elite conduits, reinforces in45
group racial hegemony and out-group racial stereotypes. On the
other hand, the same social cognition that affects Whites’ discourse
about minorities also affects their perception and interpretation of
46
minority speech. I have little doubt that much of the opposition to
40. Id. at 1187.
41. See id. at 1190 (relating that schemas “influence[] the interpretation,
encoding, and organizing of incoming information and mediate[] the drawing of
inferences or the making of predictions about the schematized object or event”).
42. See id. at 1188 (noting that because stereotypes are created outside of the
awareness of individuals, the individual employs them unintentionally).
43. See id. (explaining that people are unable to fully comprehend their own
cognitive processes, and therefore stereotypes are a product of the individual’s
unconscious mind).
44. TEUN A. VAN DIJK, COMMUNICATING RACISM: ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN THOUGHT
AND TALK 249 (1987).
45. See id. at 31 (“[S]ocial cognitions, in general, and ethnic attitudes, in
particular, are acquired, shared, validated, normalized and communicated primarily
through talk (and the media) rather than through perception and interaction.”); id.
at 359–67 (discussing how prejudicial attitudes formulated by elite groups are
promulgated through the media).
46. See id. at 23 (“[P]eople seldom act as passive reproducers of personal or social
information derived from previous communicative events. . . . [R]ecipients apply a
number of discourse comprehension strategies resulting in mental representations
that may be rather distant transformations of the original source messages.”); id. at
25 (“[T]he strategies of talk and persuasion must correspond to cognitive strategies
for the manipulation of ethnic information in memory.”); id. at 37 (“No serious
account of discourse meaning, coherence, or other semantic properties is possible
without notions such as concepts, knowledge and beliefs, frames, scripts, or models,
that is, in terms of mental representations and cognitive processes of various kinds.”);
id. at 203 (“Each time in-group members are confronted with (information about)
new, salient out-groups, they need not figure out again what properties of such a
group are relevant and about which characteristics opinions should be formed. . . .
With a minimum of information, group members are thus able to form relevant and
effective belief and opinion systems about the out-group. Obviously, this process is a
function of several social structures and processes, such as communication,
interaction, goals, and real or imagined social relationships with the out-group.”).
Dr. Fern L. Johnson’s theory of Language-Centered Perspective on Culture
captures the dynamics of interracial discourse as a cross-cultural exchange among
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my speech was born of the often unconscious processes described
above, though I do not discount the role of motivation.
I opposed what I perceived to be discrimination against Black
teaching candidates as a form of personal resistance to racism.
People of color risk psychological and physical harm in internalizing
47
discrimination. Those who use self-help to confront it are often
compelled to do so as a result of the injury wrought by discrimination
48
and as a self-defense mechanism against further harm. To be sure,
not all employees who broach subjects about race or other
controversial topics do so as an advocate. Yet their speech is still
subject to the arbitrary workings of interpretive bias (both cognitiveprocess-based and motivational) and social and situational inequality.
The stories below parallel my own in important respects. First, the
workers’ speech engages racism beyond its symbolic incarnation; the
speakers thus labor under a political and rhetorical handicap that
affects the perceived legitimacy of their speech. Second, whether
intentional or not, the speech is referential to the workers’ own social
inequality, making it more likely that the very status to which their
speech adverts becomes a determinant in assessing the speech’s
legitimacy. Finally, the workers’ social inequality is deployed by
White listeners to de-legitimate their speech.
These cases and current controversies, like my own, confirm that
outsider speech by persons of color is high-risk, norm-violational
conduct that subjects them to the economy of racialization in the
workplace. Reactions and sanctions may vary with the precise nature
of the speech and other incidentals, but in each instance, the social
inequality of the speaker—his race—plays a discernible role in the
interpretation of and reaction to his speech. I set forth the narratives
below to round out the critical foreground for interrogating whether
the First Amendment is capable of neutralizing the social inequality

American citizens. See FERN L. JOHNSON, SPEAKING CULTURALLY: LANGUAGE DIVERSITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (2000) (“Because communication arises within the cultural
frameworks of participants, it is neither neutral nor objective but, rather, thickly
cultured. . . . Intercultural communication occurs when the participants do not have
full command of one another’s cultural patterns or discourses and must somehow
communicate across the divide.”).
47. See Smith, supra note 36, at 548–49 (discussing studies on adverse health
effects, such as high blood pressure and increased feelings of stress, that result from
minorities suppressing anger over racism).
48. See id. at 548–50 (reviewing the results of studies that indicate that
suppressing one’s hostility toward racism contributes to hypertensive blood pressure
and that responding to unfair treatment reduces the deleterious effects of
discrimination).
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of the speaker in determining whether a public employee’s speech
49
will be protected.
B. Richard Ceballos and the Invisible Hand of Race
When he voiced concerns that a deputy sheriff may have falsified
information on an affidavit for a search warrant, deputy district
attorney Richard Ceballos, a Latino, was not on a crusade against
50
police misconduct, although a then-recent police corruption
scandal, the Rampart scandal, had left indelible imprints on the
49. I have intentionally selected cases and controversies involving speakers of
color whose speech is politically left-of-center for two reasons. First, as a historical
matter, Blacks who have been persecuted by the government for their speech have
been primarily those whose speech matches the left-of-center political shade. See,
e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966) (overturning on First Amendment
grounds the Georgia House of Representatives’ exclusion of Representative Julian
Bond, who had been refused his seat because of his vocal criticism of American
involvement in Vietnam); MARTIN BAUML DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON: A BIOGRAPHY
388 (1988) (chronicling the State Department’s revocation of singer-actor-activist
Robeson’s passport following his speech denouncing President Truman’s
deployment of troops to Korea and Black Americans’ service in the war); Jeffrey
Rogers Hummel, Not Just Japanese Americans: The Untold Story of U.S. Repression During
‘The Good War’, 7 J. HIST. REV. 285, 303 (1986), available at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v0
7/v07p285_Hummel.html (documenting that of the more than 200 prosecutions
during World War II under the Espionage Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
the Smith Act, or the Selective Service Act, Blacks made up the largest number, with
Black Muslims and other Blacks who sympathized with the Japanese as victims of
White oppression composing most of this group).
Second, while I do not doubt that conservative minorities such as Justice Clarence
Thomas are in some sense “raced” when they are criticized for their White-identified
views, we should appreciate the disingenuousness of their claim. Black conservatives
flirt with an inherent logical fallacy in insisting their ideology should not be defined
by racial metrics—that is, they should not be expected to reflect Black views. Even as
they insist that they should not be pigeonholed or stereotyped in this manner, some
of the most influential of this lot, like Thomas, are guilty of stereotyping Blacks
whose views are representative of the Black body politic. See Terry Smith, Autonomy
Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. REV. 261, 286–87 (2005)
(critiquing Justice Thomas’s view that a heavily Black congressional district drawn to
elect a Democrat should be viewed as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander rather
than a permissible partisan gerrymander: “Justice Thomas is a jurist who has refused
to be defined by his race to any extent but is willing to define Black voters solely in
terms of their race.”). Moreover, the Black conservative claim of being “raced” or
stereotyped is often a complaint that their views are being critiqued by other Blacks
for their racial harm in the same way these Blacks critique the views of White
conservatives. Their claim, in short, is a plea for racial exemption. Contrary to these
specious claims, when conservative minorities are “raced” in the sense that this
Article uses that term, it is in the unusual case where there is same-race authority,
see, for example, Scott Jaschik, $600K for Fired Professor, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26,
2007, http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/26/cobbs (reporting on a Black
Republican who had views that were in “a distinct minority” at a historically Black
college and was fired from her tenured position at the school), or in cases where the
conservative minority’s political calculations misfired with the White audience whose
receptivity was initially presumed. My jurisprudential analysis can be applied to
either of these non-paradigmatic circumstances.
50. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, District Attorney, Los Angeles
County, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 28, 2006).
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51

criminal justice system in Los Angeles. Nor did Ceballos author the
memoranda questioning the veracity of the police affiant as an act of
identity politics, though he describes one lieutenant seeking his
52
removal from the case as a “classical redneck.” Finally, Ceballos did
not believe his actions were perceived through racialized lenses by his
supervisors, for indeed one of his immediate supervisors was, like he,
a Latino.
Notwithstanding Ceballos’s memos, his supervisors decided to
53
proceed with prosecution of the case. At a suppression hearing,
54
Ceballos testified about the inaccuracies he found in the affidavit.
55
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In the aftermath of
these events, Ceballos was transferred from his supervisory position of
calendar attorney, assigned to another courthouse, and denied a
56
promotion. Believing these and other actions to be retaliation for
his memoranda questioning the veracity of the police affiant,
57
Ceballos sued, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme Court answered
Ceballos’s claim prophylactically. Although public sector employees
do not forfeit free speech rights by virtue of their government
employment, “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
58
their communications from employer discipline.”
Ceballos may
have fallen victim to the Supreme Court’s misguided efforts to
contrive a categorical distinction between public employee speech as
citizen and public employee speech as servant, but, at first blush and
by his own reckoning, he was not a victim of his employer’s
racialization of him or his speech. The economy of racialization,
however, is one of shades and degrees rather than demarcations.
Speech, even if not intended as identity speech, may be racialized in

51. See generally Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1, 2000, at 32
(detailing the Rampart scandal, in which corrupt Los Angeles police officers stole
drug evidence to sell on the streets, planted weapons on innocent suspects, shot
innocent victims, and falsely testified about their activities); id. at 62 (reporting that
the Rampart scandal exposed a criminal justice system in which “[c]orrupt police
officers have been protected by laws, ballot initiatives and court decisions that have
tipped the scale against defendants”).
52. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, supra note 50.
53. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1960.
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proportion to its susceptibility to being perceived as identity speech,
and racialization, in turn, does not depend on the active intentions of
60
those to whom the speech is directed.
Although he did not understand his supervisors’ retaliatory actions
to be influenced by his race or theirs, Ceballos nonetheless described
61
the mentality of his supervisors as “protect the police.” In his view,
62
he was punished for “not going along with the program.” Indeed,
Ceballos’s Latina supervisor, Najera, was arguably even more
encamped in this mentality, given her familial connections to law
63
enforcement: both her husband and brother were policemen.
Stripped of any racial connotations, the conduct of Ceballos’s
supervisors certainly fits what social psychologists refer to as “the
minimal group paradigm”: the mere existence of social groups
creates biases by which members of the in-group pre-judge members
64
of an out-group. The injection of race as an element of the social
65
group exacerbates the potential for prejudice. Here, the groups
divided along the lines of those more inclined to side with the police
and those more inclined to question them. Despite his shared
ethnicity with one of his supervisors, Ceballos’s supervisors
59. See KEITH REAVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS? WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES
RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 78–90 (1997) (using a social experiment to
demonstrate that those political issues with a greater racial content display greater
ability to prime Whites to vote against Black candidates: “The political effectiveness
of ‘racial code’ is related to Whites’ perceptions about the importance of race in the
campaign.”); Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Comment, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a
Success(?) of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 541,
570 (2005) (summarizing psychological research demonstrating that as the
importance of a group characteristic increases, the observer will categorize based on
that characteristic).
However, in formal deliberative settings outside of
conversational and political discourse, namely jury deliberations, some studies have
shown the salience of race as an issue at trial to increase the evenhandedness of
jurors’ convictions and sentencing of defendants. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1016 (2003) (“[S]tudies provide
support for the hypothesis that White juror bias is actually more likely to occur in
trials without salient racial issues, where norms regarding race are weak—a
conclusion that is consistent with theories of modern racism.”).
60. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (explaining that because the
formation of stereotypes occurs unintentionally in an individual’s subconscious, the
individual applies them in the context of racialization without knowing that he is
doing so).
61. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, supra note 50.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice, in
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 33, 45 (J. Eberhardt & S.
Fiske eds., 1998).
65. See id. at 45–46 (basing social groups on real-world factors such as race, rather
than on random factors created for the purpose of studies, intensifies prejudice
because of the existence of longstanding antagonism towards social out-groups and a
desire to maintain the present social hierarchy).
AND
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represented a hegemonic social viewpoint while Ceballos’s speech
was an outlier, particularly in the setting of a prosecutor’s office.
The “protect the police” mentality of prosecutors ensues in large
part from their dependence on the police to develop evidence and
66
testify in order to bring successful criminal prosecutions.
This
practical reality is girded by cognitive bias, for “[i]n hypothesis testing
terms, [prosecutors] are testing the hypothesis that the defendant is
guilty. The phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural
tendency to review the reports not for exculpatory evidence that
might disconfirm the tested hypothesis, but instead for inculpatory,
67
confirming evidence.” Thus, it is not difficult to understand how
and why Ceballos’s speech abridged a work norm.
Nor is it difficult to connect that workplace norm to a larger social
pathos. Setting to one side Najera’s familial associations with the
police, which likely reinforced her views, the citizenry at large tends
68
to have a favorable view of the police. Ceballos’s challenge to the
veracity of the police officer’s search warrant affidavit affronted the
mutualistic operation of societal perception and workplace norms, to
say nothing of the personal feelings of his Latina supervisor.
We have thus far artificially denuded the “protect the police”
mentality of its racial vestiges, largely in deference to Ceballos’s belief
that race played little obvious role in his discipline. Race, however,
plays an undeniable role in the public perception of the police, and
Ceballos’s challenge to the honesty of a police officer did not take
place in a cultural vacuum. One survey found that while nearly half
of Whites expressed the highest level of satisfaction with
neighborhood police, only a quarter of Blacks did, and only about a
69
third of Latinos did. Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos, are more
likely to perceive the police as corrupt, to believe that they use
excessive force, to believe that the police stop people without good
reason, and to report having been the recipient of insulting language

66. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The
Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 305 (2001) (asserting that a
prosecutor’s relationship with police officers can create conflicts with his ethical
responsibility to ensure that justice is done).
67. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603 (2006).
68. See Ben Brown & William Reed Benedict, Perceptions of the Police: Past Findings,
Methodological Issues, Conceptual Issues and Policy Implications, 25 POLICING: INT’L J.
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 543, 546–47 (2002) (citing survey data indicating that
the police represented one of the most favorably looked upon organizations in the
United States).
69. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Determinants of Public Satisfaction with the
Police, 8 POLICE Q. 279, 289 (2005).
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70

from a police officer. In light of these findings, when Ceballos, a
Latino, brought alleged police misconduct to the attention of one
White superior, Sundstedt, and another superior whose husband and
brother were police officers, his speech may not have had obvious
racial content, but it carried with it racial connotations. It is in this
regard that Ceballos’s experience can be placed within the economy
of racialization, even if at a low ebb.
The precise placement of Ceballos’s experience within the
economy of racialization varies depending on whether the
perspective is ex-ante or ex-post.
Although Ceballos’s initial
assessment of the retaliation against him was that it was largely
colorblind and outside the sector of racialization, his actions
following the incident suggest otherwise. He co-founded the Latino
71
Prosecutors Association, composed of Latino prosecutors.
He is
currently the president of the National Hispanic Prosecutors
72
Association. And he became a member of several other minority
organizations, including the Hispanic National Bar Association and
73
the California La Raza Lawyers Association. He readily attributes his
74
increased political activism to the retaliation.
Rather than a
contradiction, however, Ceballos’s assessment of his treatment versus
his reaction to it is perhaps more accurately viewed in terms of pre75
conscience versus post-conscience racial identity formation.
Ironically, the very contestability of Ceballos’s experience as a
racialization event marks an important point of convergence with my
own speech narrative. I contend that speech that expresses a
viewpoint identified with the speaker’s social inequality exposes the
speaker to discrimination that he might not have otherwise incurred
and permits the racial attributes and/or attitudes of the discussants to
70. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct, 51
SOC. PROBS. 305, 314 (2004).
71. Email from Richard Ceballos, District Attorney, Los Angeles County, to Terry
Smith (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with author).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. (“I don’t think race had much if anything to do with what happened to
me. But because of what I experienced, I became more politically active.”).
75. See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1173–76 (2004) (discussing
“progression” models of racial identity development but cautioning that these
models may not adequately explain Latino racial identity formation). My discussion
of Ceballos’s circumstances presents no occasion for me to critique the adequacy of
these progression models, since I do not purport to evaluate Ceballos’s life
circumstances but rather only the change in how Ceballos came to approach his job.
That change roughly maps the contours of progression models, in which the
minority has a neutral or negative racial self-identity but transitions to “a strongly
racially identified subject who is better socially adjusted and resilient in
discriminatory circumstances.” Id. at 1174.
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affect the perceived legitimacy of the speech. Ceballos’s avowed
intentions were quite different from my own, and his speech lacked
the obvious racial content that my statements to my colleagues about
faculty hiring did. Regardless of these differences, both types of
conduct were met with attempts at retaliation and suppression. Thus,
even if we totally de-racialize Ceballos’s experience, it nevertheless
illustrates the unique character of speech as an impetus for in-group
discrimination against non-conforming viewpoints and marks a
baseline for evaluating the reactions of authorities confronted with
speech more unambiguously identified with the social inequality of
the speaker. If Ceballos was targeted for retaliation for arguably nonracial speech made pursuant to his job, we should relax any
incredulity about the likelihood of negative reactions to racialized
speech. We will see as we progress through the continuum of
racialization that: (1) non-conforming speech, regardless of its racial
content, provokes a similar reaction against speakers of color; and
(2) the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence does little
to mitigate this problem generally and even less when the nonconforming speech is indicative of the speaker’s social inequality.
C. Rankin v. McPherson: The Black Assassin
Ardith McPherson, a Black woman who worked as a clerical in a
76
constable’s office in Texas, was an unlikely spokesperson for African
Americans, but when she spoke the sentiments of her identity group
regarding the policies of President Ronald Reagan, she assumed this
mantel, even if inadvertently. McPherson’s speech regarding the
policies of a popular president in a region of the country where his
popularity was greatest was socially taboo fare⎯speech that violated
general norms about how race and racism are to be discussed as well
as the specific culture of her workplace. Moreover, the reaction to
her speech, both from four Justices of the United States Supreme
Court and from her employer, illustrates how Black oppositional
speech is often re-interpreted by institutional actors to fit the
stereotype that such actors harbor of Blacks in general, outspoken
Blacks in particular.
Because former President Ronald Reagan has now been deified, it
may be difficult for many to remember the social divisions he
engendered as president. Reagan was as wildly unpopular among

76. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987) (describing her duties as
“purely clerical,” although her official title was deputy constable).
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African Americans as he was popular among most White voters. He
did little to dispel African Americans’ suspicions that his
“conservatism” was at least in part a stalking horse for racial
78
regression.
Indeed, a majority of Blacks viewed Reagan as a
79
Reagan began his 1980 campaign in Philadelphia,
“racist.”
Mississippi, a town associated with some of the worst violence against
80
civil rights activists during the 1960s.
The President’s crusade
against welfare cheats had a racial cast to it, as it was widely—though
inaccurately—perceived by White voters that Blacks made up the bulk
81
of welfare recipients.
Reagan aggressively opposed affirmative
82
action and nominated to the federal bench judges who took the
narrowest view of constitutional provisions and statutory rights whose
77. See THEODORE RUETER, THE POLITICS OF RACE: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM 247–48 (1995) (noting that Reagan had received the lowest
percentage of Black votes of any Republican presidential candidate and perhaps any
Republican candidate for any office in American history).
78. See id. at 47 (describing Reagan as “a chief apostle of contemporary racial
conservatism”).
79. An ABC News poll found that 56% of Blacks viewed Reagan as a racist.
Milton Coleman, Reagan Rating Falls in Poll of Blacks: 56% Say President Is a Racist,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1986, at A1. See also ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Do You
Think of Ronald Reagan as a Racist?, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
(Jan. 14, 1986), http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4299&type=
hitlist&num=0 (summarizing the results of the poll, which six years into Reagan’s
presidency found that 56% of Blacks thought Reagan was a racist).
Most White voters were fully cognizant that Reagan’s policies were harming
Blacks. A 1986 poll by the Joint Center for Political Studies asked: “Do you think
that Reagan’s policies have been harmful to blacks or not?” A striking 72% of the
White respondents answered yes. Joint Center for Political Studies, Do You Think
That Reagan’s Policies Have Been Harmful to Blacks or Not? (1986),
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4302&type=hitlist&num=3.
Yet a majority of White voters still had a favorable opinion of President Reagan
throughout his presidency. See CBS News/New York Times Poll, Is your opinion of
Ronald Reagan favorable, not favorable, undecided, or haven’t you heard enough
about Ronald Reagan yet to have an opinion?, The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research (April 12, 1990), http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest90.out_9
035&type=hitlist&num=0 (indicating that 59% of Whites had a “favorable” opinion
of Reagan in 1984 and 51% of Whites had a “favorable” opinion in 1990).
Furthermore, a substantial plurality of Whites approved of Reagan’s performance on
civil rights issues for minorities, even though they understood Reagan to be harming
Blacks. Joint Center for Political Studies, Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way
President Reagan Is Handling the Civil Rights of Minority Groups? (1986),
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4301&type=hitlist&num=2.
80. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 300 (1999) (noting that White voters were
not offended by the symbolism of Reagan commencing his campaign by declaring “I
believe in states’ rights” in a town where local Whites had murdered three civil rights
workers).
81. See id. (arguing that Reagan’s crusade against “big government” focused
mainly on programs that Whites identified with Blacks, namely welfare and food
stamps).
82. See HAROLD C. FLEMING & VIRGINIA FLEMING, THE POTOMAC CHRONICLE:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN 251 (1996) (detailing the
Reagan administration’s sustained attack on affirmative action).
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implementation profoundly affected the everyday lives of Americans
83
of color.
McPherson shared the abiding suspicions of Reagan harbored by
most African Americans. In 1981, she and some coworkers learned
over an office radio of John Hinckley’s attempted assassination of
84
President Reagan.
McPherson shortly thereafter engaged a
coworker (who was also her boyfriend) in a conversation, her
recollection of which went as follows:
Q: What did you say?
A: I said I felt that that would happen sooner or later.
Q: Okay. And what did Lawrence say?
A: Lawrence said, yeah, agreeing with me.
Q: Okay. Now, when you—after Lawrence spoke, then what was
your next comment?
A: Well, we were talking—it’s a wonder why they did that. I felt like
it would be a black person that did that, because I feel like most of
my kind is on welfare and CETA, and they use [M]edicaid, and at
the time, I was thinking that’s what it was. . . . But then after I said
that, and then Lawrence said, yeah, he’s cutting back [M]edicaid
and food stamps. And I said, yeah, welfare and CETA. I said,
85
shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him.

Although McPherson and her boyfriend believed they were in a
room by themselves, her last remark was overheard by a coworker
86
who in turn reported it to Constable Rankin.
When asked by
Rankin if she made the remark, McPherson responded, “Yes, but I
87
88
didn’t mean anything by it.” She was immediately fired.
McPherson brought suit alleging a violation of her First
Amendment rights. Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood
Marshall first noted the classic duality of the government employer:
it is both an employer concerned with the efficient operation of the
government’s affairs and a public entity bound by the constraints of
89
the First Amendment. As such, the government employer cannot
dismiss or discipline an employee merely because the employer
90
disagrees with the content of her speech. Rather, the threshold
83. See KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 80, at 302 (discussing Reagan’s efforts to
stack the federal bench with “racial conservatives”).
84. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 381–82.
88. Id. at 382.
89. Id. at 384.
90. Id.
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question in determining whether McPherson’s dismissal was
constitutional was whether her speech was “on a matter of public
91
concern.” This determination in turn depended on the content,
form, and context of McPherson’s statements. If McPherson’s speech
was on a matter of public concern, her interest in making her
statement had to be weighed against the employer’s interest in
efficiency, considering such issues as her speech’s interference with
92
work, personal relationships, and intra-office harmony.
Justice Marshall disposed of the first issue with dispatch. Because
McPherson’s statement was not a threat to kill the President, but
rather was a controversial coda in a discussion about President
Reagan’s policies that transpired after an attempt on his life, her
93
speech was clearly on a matter of public concern. In so holding,
Marshall eschewed a characterization of McPherson’s speech that
appeared apt, particularly in light of his otherwise gratuitous
94
reference to McPherson as “a black woman.” Under the eschewed
depiction of her speech, McPherson’s speech was about racial
discrimination, which, according to the Court’s prior case law, was “a
95
matter inherently of public concern.” The Court’s identification of
racial discrimination as a matter of public concern, however, is a
classic illustration of the disconnect between pronouncements of law
by the Court and social transformation. If racial discrimination is “a
matter inherently of public concern,” it is also a tinderbox, so much
so that avoidance of the charge is one reason for the lack of
96
socialization between Whites and Blacks.
But McPherson’s termination can be understood to reflect more
than the taboo and stultification around race talk in America. She
prevailed in the Supreme Court by one vote against four Justices who
ascribed violent motive to her speech in much the same way my
colleagues had instrumentally translated my own speech. Consider
Justice Scalia’s apoplectic dissent, which reflects a broader stereotype
about Black self-assertion:

91. Id. at 384–85.
92. Id. at 388–89.
93. Id. at 386.
94. Id. at 380.
95. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983) (citing Givhan v. W. Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979)).
96. See J. Nicole Shelton & Jennifer A. Richeson, Intergroup Contact and Pluralistic
Ignorance, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 97 (2005) (“Whites anticipate that
out-group members will perceive them as being cold and prejudiced and, as a
consequence, will behave negatively toward them. . . . Whites explain their avoidance
of intergroup contact as a result of their concerns about being rejected because of
their race.”).
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Given the meaning of the remark, there is no basis for the Court’s
suggestion that McPherson’s criticisms of the President’s policies
that immediately preceded the remark can illuminate it in such a
fashion as to render it constitutionally protected. Those criticisms
merely reveal the speaker’s motive for expressing the desire that the
next attempt on the President’s life succeed, in the same way that a
political assassin’s remarks to his victim before pulling the trigger
might reveal a motive for that crime. The majority’s magical
transformation of the motive for McPherson’s statement into its
content is as misguided as viewing a political assassination preceded
by a harangue as nothing more than a strong denunciation of the
97
victim’s political views.

Speech by a Black man accusing a law school of discrimination
against teaching applicants is re-interpreted as incivility. Speech by a
clerical accusing the President of discrimination is likened to an
assassination plot. Social psychology offers insights into the disparity
between speech and perception. Studies suggest that a racial
minority’s social inequality has a negative impact on the listener’s
perception of what is said. These studies do not focus on political
speech as such.
Instead, they examine so-called ambiguously
aggressive acts by both White and Black subjects to determine
whether those acts are interpreted similarly by an observer. A 1980
study by Sagar and Schofield in the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology concluded as follows:
[E]ven relatively innocuous acts by black males are likely to be
considered more threatening than the same behaviors by white
males. This tendency to perceive threat in blacks’ behaviors
appears to be all too generalizable to a number of situations and
populations in this country. It occurred in Duncan’s study in
which white college students saw one confederate give another a
light shove in the context of a rather heated discussion. It
appeared again in this study as sixth-grade students judged four
different interaction types that involved no direct suggestion of
anger and, in two cases, no physical contact whatsoever. Most
notably, in this study behavior ratings by black students reflected
98
the same antiblack bias as those by white students.

97. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 396–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
98. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black
and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1980).
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Sagar and Schofield and other social psychologists reveal how
99
people of color become victims of “differential social perception.”
Predicated on psychology’s empiricism that “we tend to perceive what
100
we wish or expect to perceive,” testing of the differential social
perception hypothesis has found that Whites have a lower threshold
for perceiving an act as violent when the actor is Black than when a
101
White performs the very same act.
The intrusion of racial
stereotypes into social perceptions has been demonstrated to affect
102
the speed with which Whites identify weapons and the rate at which
103
they misidentify a harmless object as a weapon.
Regardless of the experimental context, however, if racial
stereotype taints our perception of ambiguously aggressive behavior
by Blacks, it undoubtedly taints our perception of self-assertive
behavior by Blacks, particularly when the behavior is speech about
race itself, speech associated with the actor’s social inequality.
Sociolinguists’ study of cultural communication norms supplies a
critical insight into the cognitive and rhetorical dissonance between
Justice Marshall’s and Justice Scalia’s perceptions of McPherson’s
speech:
Many of the more assertive and aggressive African American
behaviors (e.g., shouting, threatening) are not in the realm of
typical public behavior for European Americans and signal
impending physical violence when presented.
European
Americans may interpret African American behavior as signaling
physical confrontation when none is intended, particularly when
the behavior includes shouting, animated gesturing, and staring.
Kochman (1981) argues that relative confidence in the ability to
deal with anger is the basis for these divergent perceptions. . . .
African Americans have less need to repress these feelings and

99. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590,
590–98 (1976).
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 596. Like Sagar and Schofield’s experiment, Duncan’s involved a series
of taped vignettes, the scripts for which varied only with respect to the race of the
harm-doer and the victim. The discussion between the actors becomes somewhat
excited and culminates in one actor lightly shoving the other. The tapes were shown
individually to 104 White undergraduate students attending the University of
California at Irvine. When the harm-doer was Black, 75% of the students described
his actions as violent, whereas when the harm-doer was White and the victim Black,
only 17% of the subjects labeled the behavior as violent. Id. at 595.
102. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 187 (2001)
(“[N]on-Black participants were faster to identify guns when they were primed by
Black versus White faces.”).
103. Id. at 188.
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their expressions since they believe they can control the escalation
104
of events.

If racial stereotypicality permeates a Supreme Court Justice’s view
of McPherson’s language, it is not difficult to understand how it may
have infected her supervisor’s decision to terminate her. Antiblack
mythology is ingrained into the sub-conscience of White Americans.
The discipline of social psychology confirms that much racism is
aversive in character and arises from deep-seated cognitive and
105
attitudinal biases.
As a working-class Black woman, McPherson’s
speech on a matter of public concern potentially primed a number of
106
such biases held by her White superior, Rankin.
For instance,
Whites attempt to conceal the existence of racism in the United
107
States by insisting that equal opportunity exists for all. Speech such
as McPherson’s that challenges this notion by questioning the racial
sensitivity of the President of the United States may have upset White
norms. Likewise, the stereotype of the indolent Black welfare
108
recipient is common among White Americans.
McPherson’s
defense of welfare and similar programs may have activated that
stereotype. In any case, the power differential between McPherson
and her boss made it more likely that Rankin would bring to bear
negative stereotypes in his decision-making, for social psychology
confirms that the situational inequality of a minority increases the
109
tendency of Whites to deploy such stereotypes.
So, too, does a
heightened emotional state, which Rankin was likely experiencing
110
upon hearing McPherson’s remarks.
As a social unequal, McPherson’s exercise of her First Amendment
rights was freighted with these and other disabilities. Had she been a
104. MICHAEL L. HECHT ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNICATION: ETHNIC
IDENTITY AND CULTURAL INTERPRETATION 105 (Language & Language Behaviors vol. 2,
1993).
105. Krieger, supra note 39, at 1188–91.
106. See Email from Jeri Costello, Constable, to Terry Smith (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file
with author) (stating that Rankin is White, though his race is omitted from the case).
107. See JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS 150–51 (1st ed.
1995) (outlining “the gospel of the work ethic” that is so central to the White
conception of self).
108. Id. at 151.
109. See Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181 (2003)
(“[P]articipants [in the study] exposed to a black subordinate . . . revealed greater
automatic racial bias . . . than participants anticipating an interaction with a black
superior”); id. (“Situational power is known to influence the extent to which
individuals engage in category-based information processing, such as stereotyping.”).
110. See Hai-Sook Kim & Robert S. Baron, Exercise and the Illusory Correlation: Does
Arousal Heighten Stereotypic Processing?, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 366–80
(1988) (confirming the correlation between physiological arousal and an increased
tendency to perceive stereotypical similarities).
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Black man and spoken the same words, the racialization of her
speech may well have been greater. The threat perception by Whites
is greater when assertive conduct is engaged in by Black males,
111
regardless of age.
I had understood this during my years of
advocating for minority hiring and refusing to be co-opted or coerced
into silence. My activism prompted two White colleagues to
comment to another that the law school would not likely hire another
Black man in the near future. The colleague to whom the remark
was made admonished them that their disposition smacked of illegal
discrimination, among other opprobrium. The anti-racist norm
112
transgressors instantly sought refuge in what sociolinguist Teun van
Dijk has termed “transfer[ring] the charge to others: ‘I have nothing
113
against blacks, but my neighbours (customers, etc.). . . .’” Although
the norm transgressors disassociated themselves from their own
statements, fifteen years after my hiring, I remained one of two Black
male faculty members, the other having been hired at the same time
as I.
As different as McPherson’s motivations to speak may have been
from mine—she appears to have been engaged in casual
conversation, I in a cause—the convergence in the treatment of our
speech, its racialization, is remarkable and suggests the limitations of
current First Amendment doctrine to protect public sector workers
like McPherson. Pickering/Connick’s balancing test, coupled with its
recent hollowing by Garcetti, is a baleful invitation for the public
employee to address a matter of public concern where the employee

111. Sagar & Schofield, supra note 98, at 596; see Wendy Berry Mendes et al.,
Challenge and Threat During Social Interactions with White and Black Men, 28 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 939, 950 (2002) (reporting the results of an experiment that
used physiological reactions to measure threat perception). Among the authors’
conclusions were: “The results of this experiment support the hypothesis that
participants experience threat during social encounters with devalued group
members. Non-Black participants interacting with Black or disadvantaged SES
confederates exhibited CV responses consistent with threat during two separate
tasks.” Mendes et al., supra, at 950; see also Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and
Higher Education for Black Americans: The Lingering-Effects Theory, 71 J.L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 1, 57–58 (2005) (“[A]ssertive behavior by Black males that is
encouraged in the home and on the playground usually is seen as negative behavior
in the classroom.” (quoting Valora Washington & Joanna Newman, Setting Our Own
Agenda: Exploring the Meaning of Gender Disparities Among Blacks in Higher Education, 60
J. NEGRO EDUC. 19, 23 (1991))) (quotations omitted).
112. See David Mellor et al., The Perception of Racism in Ambiguous Scenarios, 27 J.
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 473, 473 (2001) (asserting that overt racism is viewed as
politically unacceptable in the United States).
113. Teun A. van Dijk, Denying Racism: Elite Discourse and Racism, in RACISM AND
MIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 179, 181 (J. Solomos & J. Wrench eds., 1993),
available at http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Denying%20racism%20-%20Elite
%20discourse%20and%20racism.pdf [hereinafter Elite Discourse].
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is already more likely to be the victim of discrimination. The slender
one-vote reed on which McPherson’s victory in the Supreme Court
hung suggests that First Amendment public employee jurisprudence
does not account for the social inequality of speakers and is thus
unable to effectively intervene in the economy of racialization in the
workplace.
D. Ward Churchill and Heretic Voices of Color in a Moment of Unity
Professor Ward Churchill is a Native American scholar and activist
who is not ocularly identifiable as a racial minority. His statements
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, would
eventually cause him to be repeatedly identified as a Native American
and marginalized for bringing to bear “an Indian point of view”
114
about contested issues of Native American history, even as his own
authenticity as a Native American was questioned by critics. In the
process of this controversy’s unfolding, Churchill would find himself
in the company of a distinct minority—some of the most prominent
members of which were Black Americans—who did not outwardly
115
conform to post-9/11 expectations of good citizenship. In an essay
entitled “Some People Push Back”: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,
Churchill questioned the innocence of those who perished in the
World Trade Center because they had, however passively, supported
the United States’ surgical bombing of Iraq that had led to the deaths
116
of 500,000 Iraqi children.
Likening Americans’ support of the
bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War and afterwards to German
114. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, Professor of Ethnic Studies,
University of Colorado at Boulder, in Boulder, Colo. (Mar. 9, 2007).
115. See Edward Epstein, Lone Dissenter in House War Vote is Oakland’s Lee, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 2001, at A10 (stating that Representative Barbara Lee of Oakland,
California was the only member of Congress to vote against the resolution passed
within days of 9/11 that gave the President authority to attack Afghanistan); George
Will, Populist Russ Feingold Could Be Democrats’ Answer in 2008, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Nov. 13, 2005, at 5E (noting that another Black congresswoman,
Representative Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, suggested that the Bush
administration had known in advance about the 9/11 attacks). McKinney “darkly
hints that President Bush may have known that the 9/11 attacks were coming and
welcomed them as a boost for defense-industry stocks owned by ‘persons close to’ his
administration.” Will, supra; see also Cedric John, Black Radical Enigma, MONTHLY
REV., Dec. 2004, at 42 (pointing out that New Jersey State poet laureate Amiri Baraka
ignited a firestorm by suggesting that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had prior
knowledge of the 9/11 attacks and forewarned Jewish employees to exit the towers).
Other acts of protests by African Americans drew less notoriety because they did not
involve public figures. See, e.g., Betty Pleasant, Black Voices of Dissent Raised Amid
National Unity, L.A. SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 2001, at A1 (two American Black Muslim
firefighters in Miami-Dade County refused to ride fire engines featuring the
American flag because they viewed the flag as a symbol of oppression).
116. Churchill, supra note 18.
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citizens’ support for Adolf Hitler, Churchill said of the World Trade
Center victims:
To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and
consequences to others of what they were involved in—and in
many cases excelling at—it was because of their absolute refusal to
see. More likely, it was because they were too busy braying,
incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging
power lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated,
conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the
starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there was a better, more
effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting
their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile
sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be interested in hearing
117
about it.

“Little Eichmanns” is a reference to Adolf Eichmann, an architect of
118
the Holocaust.
Although the media and press focused on the above-quoted
statement, which itself makes no reference to race, the broader scope
119
of the essay (or as Churchill calls it, the op-ed piece ) expresses an
ethno-contrarian perspective, borrowing its title from Malcolm X’s
infamous reaction to the assassination of John F. Kennedy—“chickens
coming home to roost”—and describing Iraqi children killed during
America’s bombing campaign as “vast legions of brown-skinned fiveyear-olds . . . shivering in the dark, wide-eyed in horror, whimpering
120
as they expired in the most agonizing ways imaginable.” The essay
represented his “intellectual understanding as a person of color” of
121
Unlike Ceballos or McPherson, Churchill’s
the events of 9/11.
speech was race-conscious and represented a form of identity
122
advocacy. Although his speech’s point of entry into the economy of
117. Id.
118. See Michelle York, Remark on 9/11 Sparks Storm at College, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2005, at B3 (describing Eichmann as “the architect of the plan to exterminate the
Jews”). Churchill disputes the popular media’s understanding of Eichmann’s role in
the Holocaust and hence of Churchill’s analogy: “The comparison was of
technocrats. Eichmann is someone who, after all, killed no one. He made the trains
run on time.” Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
119. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
120. Churchill, supra note 18.
121. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
122. Although the essay represented his intellectual understanding of 9/11 as a
person of color, Churchill believes that “a White person would end up with the same
intellectual understanding as a person of color” if the White person possessed a
factual understanding of United States history. Id. By this, Churchill does not imply
that the thoughts he articulated in the essay were shared by people of color but not
by Whites. Id. Indeed, there appears to be no polling data taken in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 seeking to gauge racial differences in the perception
of events. Whether mass silence and expressions of empathy after 9/11 can be taken
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racialization differs somewhat from the prior narratives, Churchill
believes that his social inequality, his status as a self-identifying person
of color, figured determinatively in the amplitude with which his
speech was heard.
Churchill’s controversial post-9/11 essay did not exist in a vacuum;
it was part of a continuum of a decades-long political and scholarly
activism in the Native American Movement. In January of 2005,
Hamilton College in New York rescinded a speaking invitation to
Churchill because of the essay, though the piece by then was three
123
years old and had gone largely unnoticed. Shortly before Hamilton
College’s negation, Churchill had been a defendant in a criminal trial
in which he and others were indicted for their actions in connection
with a protest of a Denver-area Columbus Day celebration, an event
124
which Churchill believes glorifies the genocide of Indians.
Representing himself pro se, Churchill used the trial as a teaching
125
moment about the genocide.
After his acquittal, Churchill held a
news conference, a victory lap of sorts. The celebration would be a
tempered one, for Hamilton College’s revocation of its invitation and
the flap over his 9/11 comments would follow shortly. These
controversies, in Churchill’s view, were part of a different continuum:
a sustained effort to blunt his “counter-hegemonic interpretation of
126
American history and social order.”
In the ensuing controversy, race would present itself as a paradox
of sorts. Although hate mail and threats of violence referenced
Churchill’s Native American heritage derogatorily, others—including
at one point, Churchill’s employer, the University of Colorado—

as national unity across races is a complex inquiry. See Norma Adams-Wade, A
Different Perspective on Sept. 11, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2001, at 18A (noting
that prominent Black activists had withheld criticism of United States policy in the
wake of 9/11).
Churchill’s personal experience in receiving approximately 8,000 emails following
the inception of the controversy over his essay was that of those who identified
themselves racially or whose race could be discerned, the emails reacting negatively
to the essay were almost exclusively from Whites while those from people of color
were positive. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
123. The College, however, did not initially revoke its invitation to Churchill;
rather, it changed his appearance to a “panel discussion.” York, supra note 118.
Churchill’s visit was ultimately cancelled after Hamilton College received more than
6,000 emails objecting to Churchill’s visit, and Churchill and Hamilton College officials
received threats of violence. Patrick D. Healy, College Cancels Speech Over 9/11
Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at B1.
124. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
125. According to Churchill, “the argument to genocide is key to all of my work.”
Id.
126. Id.
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127

questioned the authenticity of his heritage.
The former conduct,
128
which the university apparently ignored, is easily recognized as
unadorned racialization. The inquisition into Churchill’s heritage,
however, is less cognizable as the deployment of race to de-legitimate
Churchill’s speech, since on its face it appears to be an effort to
remove the cloak of race from the controversy. But such questions of
129
authenticity sought to undermine Churchill’s overall credibility.
Moreover, from Churchill’s point of view, the questions were an
exercise in the ultimate kind of racial supremacy. “The power is in
130
the naming,” according to Churchill.
The questions around
authenticity conveyed the message, “You will be who you’re told to
131
be.”
The University of Colorado eventually conceded that it could not
132
discipline Churchill for his remarks about 9/11.
Nevertheless,
133
undeterred by appearances of pretext, the university brought
charges of “research misconduct” against Churchill on the heels of

127. See Kirk Johnson, University Changes Its Focus in Investigation of Professor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A9 (“Detractors of Professor Churchill came out of the
woodwork, questioning his claim to be part Indian.”). The University of Colorado
undertook a preliminary review of allegations that Churchill had fabricated his
Indian heritage and referred the matter for further investigation because his Indian
identity was “material to his scholarship.” Report on Conclusion of Preliminary
Review in the Matter of Professor Ward Churchill (Mar. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/report.html.
128. An Open Letter from the Department of Ethnic Studies, University of
Colorado at Boulder to the Board of Regents, President Betsy Hoffman and Interim
Chancellor Phil DiStefano (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://wardchurchill.net/files
/b_ethnic_studies_open_letter.pdf (“The University is well aware that Ward
Churchill and other members of the Department have been subjected to death
threats, threats of violence and overtly racist attacks. It could have publicly
condemned these threats of violence and expressions of racial hostility. Instead, its
stunning silence has effectively empowered the attackers to continue.”).
129. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
130. Id.
131. Id. Others, however, viewed questions about the authenticity of Churchill’s
Native American heritage as being integral to questions about the integrity of his
scholarship. See, e.g., David Kelly, Colorado Professor Faces Claims of Academic Fraud, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at A17 (noting critics ascribed a motive to Churchill’s
questioning “blood quantum” standards for Indians in federal law: “Critics say
Churchill’s motives were clear: As long as tribes required some standard of proof for
membership, he would never be admitted.”).
132. Johnson, supra note 127.
133. Because the research misconduct inquiry followed so closely on the heels of
the controversy surrounding Churchill’s 9/11 remarks, the use of research
misconduct as a basis for terminating Churchill likely creates a mixed-motive First
Amendment case, in which the university must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached that same decision to terminate Churchill even
in the absence of his 9/11 comments. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (stating that the board of education must show by a
preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same employment
decision even in the absence of a teacher’s protected statements).
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the public controversy over his 9/11 remarks. The charges centered
on “a small fraction of Professor Churchill’s extensive body of
academic work,” in most instances focusing on “no more than a few
134
paragraphs within much longer essays . . . .”
The Committee
investigating the charges consisted of no Native Americans and no
scholars of Native American Studies, a subset of Ethnic Studies, the
135
department in which Churchill was tenured.
From Churchill’s
standpoint—one symbolically corroborated by the Committee’s
composition—the investigation was an attempt at “re-asserting white
136
expertise, white authority, white interpretation.”
The Committee issued a 124-page report finding Churchill guilty
of research misconduct and recommending that he be de-tenured
137
and terminated. An appreciation of the report’s broader context is
essential to any assessment of the role of race, real or perceived, in
the report’s production.
On the one hand, the Committee
acknowledged that the timing of its investigation was suspect, and it
138
questioned the university’s motives in pursuing the charges.
This
acknowledgment, however, had the whiff of a prelude, for the
Committee proceeded as if its own actions could be hermitically
cordoned off from the events that precipitated—or least inarguably
preceded—its constitution. On the other hand, the Committee
acknowledged that the essays under scrutiny were “broad accounts”
139
for which “extensive notes would not be expected or required.”
The Committee then undertook a minutely detailed inspection of
Churchill’s footnotes.
Where one omission or mistake was
insufficient to constitute a basis for a finding of research misconduct,
134. Report of the Investigative Committee of the Standing Committee on
Research Misconduct at the University of Colorado at Boulder Concerning
Allegations of Academic Misconduct Against Professor Ward Churchill, May 9, 2006,
at 8, available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/download/Ward
ChurchillReport.pdf [hereinafter Report on Research Misconduct].
135. Id. at 103–05. The Committee did have as a member a Chicano, José Limón.
Churchill describes Limón as “[t]he Whitest person on the panel.” Telephone
Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. He adds, “People of color serving in
this capacity are striving to be whiter than White.” Id. Here, Churchill is alluding to
the phenomenon of “exceptionalism.” Exceptionalism is an implicit pact between
Whites seeking cover from the charge of racism and a person of color seeking to
ingratiate himself with those Whites to ostracize an outspoken person of color. See
Smith, supra note 36, at 546 n.111 (explaining that exceptionalism entails elevating
some members of the subordinate group above others, where the White decisionmaker may essentially tell the preferred minority that he is not like the others).
136. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
137. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 99. The disciplinary
recommendation, which was not part of the university’s charge to the Committee,
was not unanimous. Id. at 102.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Id. at 10.
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the Committee bootstrapped that omission or mistake to others to
find a “pattern,” parts of which depended on the others for
140
Finally, the Committee purported not to
substantive significance.
act as arbiters of contested historical fact in Native American
141
history.
Yet its enterprise inexorably devolved into the realm of
142
In sum, any evaluation of
arbiter at several points in its report.
whether race affected the Committee’s interpretation of and reaction
to Churchill’s speech (specifically, his scholarship) must bear in mind
the aegis under which the Committee was constituted and the crosspurposes that its charge appeared to impose on it.
Sociolinguist Teun van Dijk posits, “If knowledge is power, then
knowledge of other people may be an instrument of power over other
people. This truism is especially relevant in examining the academic
143
discourse of race and ethnicity.”
If the inquiry into Churchill’s
scholarship was a contrived metamorphosis of identity-based remarks
about 9/11 into concerns about academic integrity, it was likewise a
foray (even if inadvertent) into the controversial question of who
should control historical narrative—who, in van Dijk’s terms, shall
exercise power. Churchill is raced in this inquisition, not because of
its inherently racial properties—that would be a tautology—but
rather because the Committee suffuses its situational power with
characteristics of racial hegemony. A central charge of research
misconduct against Churchill focused on whether he exaggerated his
claims that the United States Army intentionally spread smallpox to
Mandan Indians by distributing infected blankets to them. The
144
report concludes that Churchill “fabricated” his account, and that it

140. Compare id. at 73 (noting that the omission of the page number of a source
was not serious “unless it forms part of a pattern”), with id. at 82 (aggregating
Churchill’s alleged mistakes to find the requisite pattern).
141. See id. at 12 (“The Committee stresses that we were not charged with
determining what actually happened in southern New England in 1614–1618 or Fort
Clark, North Dakota, in 1837. We have accordingly not tried to produce our own
account of those events.”).
142. See id. at 94 (“Professor Churchill was disrespectful of Indian oral traditions
when dealing with the Mandan/Fort Clark smallpox epidemic of 1837.”); id. at 97
(acknowledging genocidal campaigns against Indians but finding that Churchill had
exaggerated his claims); id. at 65 (acknowledging that members of the United States
Army held “strong anti-Indian views” but concluding there was “no evidence to
support Professor Churchill’s claim that the U.S. Army intended to kill off the
Mandan Indians”). In a puzzling admission that belied its ability to settle the
disputed matters of history before it, though it embarked on precisely that task, the
Committee conceded that “we have not attempted to examine every possible work
written on the topics in question: we have merely examined the evidence relevant to
his particular claims.” Id. at 12.
143. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 158.
144. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 68.
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145

could find “no evidence to support this claim.”
The Committee
does not question that genocide was attempted on American
146
Indians, nor does it appear to question that smallpox was one agent
of the attempted genocide. This is for good reason, for prominent
historians have documented the use of biological warfare against the
147
Indians.
Moreover, there is abundant historical evidence that the
United States Army was instrumental in carrying out the attempted
148
genocide against the Indians,
even if the specific means of
annihilation is subject to debate.
That the Committee held Churchill to a more exacting standard
because of the role of ethnicity is evidenced by the language of the
report itself. “The interdisciplinary work and social commitment of
ethnic studies scholars may require an even stronger fealty to
149
standards of veracity and evidence,” the Committee wrote,
presaging the standards under which it would judge Churchill’s
scholarship. Although such paternalism does not necessarily equate
to racism, it harkens to a frequent strategy of Whites met with a claim
of racism, particularly when the claim is unorthodox or radical in
nature. The “irritation with minority radicals who are seen as
‘exaggerating’” is one symptom of modern institutional racism in
150
academia.
Both within and outside of academia, Whites respond
defensively to charges of racism with the challenge to “prove it!”—
151
and not merely by inference.
In holding fast to footnote details
that it initially acknowledged were not even necessary to be provided,

145. Id. at 69.
146. Id. at 97.
147. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 87 (1999)
(documenting the use of smallpox-infected blankets by the British Army against
Indians in lands west of the Appalachians and describing this stratagem as “a
pioneering effort at what is now called biological warfare”).
148. See, e.g., WILLIAM LOREN KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE 55–57
(1997) (detailing the United States military’s role in quashing Seminole Indian
resistance at “Fort Negro”: “[f]or years, the U.S. sent its enormous resources of
troops, ships, and military supplies to crush Seminole resistance to its slaveholding
way of life”).
149. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 6; see also id. at 97 (“[T]he
damage done to the reputation of ethnic studies as a field . . . is a consideration in
our assessment of the seriousness of Professor Churchill’s conduct.”).
150. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 195.
151. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1378 (1992)
(“When a white person hears a black person use a word like ‘racist,’ the response is
often a strong defensive reaction that implicitly says to the black person, ‘prove it!’
And the standards of proof are those white people are comfortable with: evidence of
conscious racial animus, intent to harm and degrade.”).
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the Committee exhibited these common traits of White supremacy in
152
discourse.
Churchill himself is less certain about another regard in which the
Committee arguably subordinated him based on his social inequality.
At the conclusion of its report, the Committee opines on Churchill’s
attitude, his collegiality or lack thereof, and his alleged propensity for
153
the ad hominem in responding to critics.
Churchill initially
observed that these comments “could be” racial in nature but later
more strongly characterized them as being part of the “recantation
154
dimension” of the Committee’s efforts. According to Churchill, in
seeking contrition from him, the Committee behaved as if it were
155
asking him to “prove that I’m subjugated to you [the Committee].”
Professor Sumi Cho has addressed the racial dimension of collegiality
standards:
“Collegial” is what those in power happen to define it as at the
time. As such, it absorbs the normative values of the dominant
culture. Thus, the utter malleability of the term poses the same
dangers to particular identity groups as any other doctrine or rule
that suffers from over-vagueness. . . . Under this “can’t we all get
along” formulation, those who transgress the cultural norm of
gendered and racial hierarchy appear to be “impolite” and
156
“uncollegial” regardless of history, context, or power relations.

The context and mechanisms for the racialization of Ward
Churchill and his speech and scholarship are complex and have the
character of both motivational and cognitive behavior. Yet Churchill
believes his racialization is at its root quite simple. Regarding the
9/11 essay, Churchill opines, “I don’t think a White person would
have written it,” and if he had, the University of Colorado “would have
157
simply tried to ignore it.”
152. The Committee condescendingly attributed Churchill’s alleged research
misconduct to his lack of formal training in history and lack of a doctorate degree.
See Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 100. The racial connotations
of this language rest not in elitism—for such is perhaps an endemic characteristic of
the academy—but rather in its skewed application. Whites have assumed some of the
most important positions in our society without the formal credentials for doing so.
See, e.g., RAVI BATRA, GREENSPAN’S FRAUD 81 (2005) (recounting Alan Greenspan’s
appointment as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors despite his lack of a
Ph.D. and lack of scholarship).
153. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 98.
154. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.
155. Id.
156. Cho, supra note 35, at 809.
157. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. Churchill uses
Noam Chomsky, a controversial White professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, as a point of comparison. Id. But even White elected officials have made
statements substantively similar to Churchill’s, and they have been lauded for their
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E. Leonard Jeffries: The Black Racist
158

Leonard Jeffries is a “racist.” He is not a racist because he denied
people jobs or other opportunities based on their race. Nor did he
gain this disrepute by committing an act of racial violence. Instead,
he is a racist because of the way he discussed racism. In criticizing
public school curricula as racially biased, Jeffries laced his oratory
with the miasma of ethnic insult. He referred to various state and
federal officials as an “ultimate, supreme, sophisticated, debonair
159
racist” and a “sophisticated, Texas Jew.” He accused “rich Jews” of
160
He also opined that Jews and
having financed the slave trade.
“Mafia figures” in the media conspired to negatively portray and
161
thereby destroy Blacks.
In addition to ethnic stereotyping, Jeffries’s speech was
controversial because it was at points specific, lambasting not Whites
generally—for which he would have been charged with
overbreadth—but Jews directly and Italians indirectly. The broader
purpose of Jeffries’s speech, and whatever legitimacy that purpose
might have had, was subsumed by his choice of language. Jeffries is
racist because in the American dialectic on race, Americans have
equated racial insult with other kinds of racism and have placed the
162
speaker on a par with other racist actors.
If, however, Ardith
honesty rather than persecuted. For instance, Congressman Ron Paul of Texas, a
2008 presidential aspirant, recently said the following about 9/11:
Have you ever read the reasons they attacked us? They attacked us because
we’ve been over there; we’ve been bombing Iraq for 10 years. . . . I’m
suggesting that we listen to the people who attacked us and the reason they
did it, and they are delighted that we’re over there because Osama bin
Laden has said, “I’m glad you’re over on our sand because we can target you
so much easier.”
Editorial, Between the Lines at the GOP Debate, II: Ron Paul Has Earned His Place at the
Podium, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 18, 2007, http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/
opinion/editorials/article_1698826.php.
The conservative Orange County Register praised Paul’s honesty. See id. (criticizing
Paul’s political opponents for mischaracterizing his forthright statements regarding
the causes of the 9/11 attacks, and implying that Paul’s campaign continues to “gain
steam” because of his honesty). So, too, did numerous other publications, such as
the less ideological Des Moines Register. See David Yepsen, Editorial, Romney, Paul,
Giuliani All ‘Win’ in GOP Debate, DES MOINES REG., May 17, 2007, at A15 (noting that
Paul’s opposition to the war may help him gain some support if the GOP does not
fare well in 2008).
158. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), modified by 52 F.3d 9 (2d
Cir. 1995).
159. Jeffries, 21 F. 3d at 1242.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. This is akin to what Professor Martha Mahoney describes as “color evasion”:
When whites are color evasive, they fail to notice their own color, the color
of others, and any difference between them. Color evasion treats noticing
color or race as a manifestation of prejudice. Although color evasion seems
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McPherson exercised her free speech rights under the weight of an
American discomfort with racial discourse in general and a White
tendency to radicalize the speech and actions of Blacks, Jeffries was
similarly handicapped because he is a Black racist.
Derrick Bell’s allegorical work, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The
163
Permanence of Racism, forcefully depicts the caldron that envelopes
the Black speaker who breaches what Bell refers to as “the rules of
racial standing.” Bell gives definition to one of these rules by
engaging in a dialogue with a fictional character named Geneva. He
asks, “It’s not set out in the Fourth Rule, Geneva, but have you
noticed that those blacks who utter ‘beyond the pale’ remarks are
164
never forgiven.”
Citing the Reverend Jesse Jackson’s “Hymie and
Hymietown” remarks from his 1984 presidential bid as well as
remarks by the controversial Louis Farrakhan, Geneva responds:
I understand why a group is upset by what it deems racial or
religious insults, but I doubt that I’m alone in not understanding
why blacks who lack any real power in society are not forgiven while
whites, including those at the highest levels of power, are
pardoned. For example, many Jewish spokespeople complained
bitterly when President Reagan went to lay a wreath at the Nazi
cemetery at Bitburg in Germany, but they do not continue to
harass him about the issue everywhere he goes. No one denounced
Reagan as anti-Semitic for going. More significantly, neither
President Bush nor the whites who support him are called on to
165
condemn Reagan in order to prove that they are not anti-Semitic.
to many white Americans like courtesy, the idea that noticing race is itself
prejudiced rests on a fundamental sense that race involves the inferiority of
the “Other.” White privilege is the product of a social history of racial power
and subordination. Adopted in an effort to avoid being racist, color evasion
implicitly preserves values drawn from essentialist racism.
Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the AntiTransformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 808–09 (2003).
The notion of an equivalency between White racism and conduct such as
Jeffries’s has been persuasively rejected:
What is often referred to as “black racism” consists of judgments made about
whites by some black leaders or commentators to the effect that “no white
people can be trusted” or “the white man is the devil.” But these critical
ideas or negative prejudices are not the equivalent of modern white racism.
The latter involves not just individual thoughts but also widely socialized
ideologies and omnipresent practices based on entrenched racialized beliefs.
The prejudices and myths used to justify antiblack actions are not invented
by individual perpetrators, nor are they based only on personal experience.
These patterns of highly racialized thought are embedded in the culture and
institutions of a white-centered society.
FEAGIN & VERA, supra note 107, at x.
163. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1992).
164. Id. at 121–22.
165. Id. at 122.
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The meta-principle that one divines from the colloquy is that race
talk in the United States is framed in a hierarchy, an ordering that is
influenced by the race of the speaker, the object or subject of his
speech, and the political power of those who are insulted by the
speech. This hierarchy, in turn, supplies Whites accused of racism
with an arsenal of rhetorical devices to blunt the charge while
reinforcing the accuser’s social inequality. Sociolinguist Teun van
Dijk discusses the common practice of denial and observes that
“denials often lead to the strategic move of reversal: Not we are the
166
racists, they are the ‘true racists.’” The anti-racist speaker is recast as
167
This move is facilitated by the social
the racist in reversal.
dominance of the group practicing reversal and the relative political
168
weakness of the accuser.
In practical terms, it did not matter whether Jeffries was correct in
his charge that New York school curricula were racially biased; his
selection of language allowed critics to deploy the full panoply of
169
denial techniques, including reversal.
This has significant
consequences for the perpetuation of societal discrimination. The
power not only to dismiss a problem as non-existent but to define the
language with which the problem must be discussed is the ultimate
power of evasion. Moreover, the charge of racism or anti-Semitism
against an African American has a potency that it lacks against a more
170
powerful actor.
If racism is a cause of one’s social inequality,
indicting him with that very malevolence diffuses responsibility for his
inequality. The identity of the victims and perpetrators of racism
becomes discursive, and the elusiveness of culpability sets a
psychological, cultural, rhetorical, and even legal boundary against
171
which the propriety of protest or outsider discourse is measured. In
166. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 184. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
refers to this defense mechanism simply as “projection,” a rhetorical device used to
“escape from guilt and responsibility and affix blame elsewhere.” EDUARDO BONILLASILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM 63–64 (2d ed. 2006).
167. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 184.
168. See id. at 181 (“Denials challenge the very legitimacy of anti-racist analysis,
and thus are part of the politics of ethnic management: as long as a problem is being
denied in the first place, the critics are ridiculed, marginalised or delegitimated:
denials debilitate resistance.”).
169. For instance, the President of City College, Jeffries’s employer, condemned
his remarks as “racist” and “anti-Semitic.” Joseph Berger, College Chief Calls Jeffries
‘Racist,’ But Defends Keeping Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at B1.
170. See infra notes 174–181 and accompanying text (recalling several instances of
racism by politicians and others in the public eye and noting that the public is more
tolerant of White racist behavior than controversial Black speech).
171. Cf. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 227 (discussing the diffusion of blame
for racism in the Netherlands). “[D]iscrimination is presented as a universal
characteristic of humanity, which seems to make it as harmless as a traffic
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the legal context, for instance, Justice Powell could rationalize his
cabined view of permissible affirmative action by noting that:
[T]he white “majority” itself is composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.
Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and
corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of
race and nationality, for then the only “majority” left would be a
172
new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

Because of these boundaries and the capacious definition of
“minority” that they accommodate, even a broad charge of
discrimination, in contrast to Jeffries’s pointed accusations, may
173
subject a Black speaker to the process of reversal.
The process of reversal marginalizes the Black speaker in a way that
comparable charges of racism against a White do not. From their
support of Ronald Reagan, despite their belief that his policies
174
harmed Blacks, to the re-ascension of Senator Trent Lott after his
175
White Americans have
public embrace of segregation,
misdemeanor, while at the same time defusing the special role of white Europeans in
racism.” Id. at 227.
172. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–96 (Powell, J.) (1978)
(plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court). More recently, Justice
Stevens has harshly criticized this type of rhetorical maneuver by the Supreme
Court’s conservative majority in rolling back the goals of primary and secondary
school integration:
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The first sentence in the
concluding paragraph of his opinion states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren
were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of
their skin . . . .” This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation:
“[T]he majestic equality of the la[w] forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the street, and to steal their bread.” THE CHIEF
JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so
ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children
struggling to attend black schools.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit AntiSemitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (1995) (because Jews and Asian Americans are
“traditionally oppressed groups,” disproportionately represented in economic and
educational elites, denominating the concept of merit as a social construct intended
to perpetuate the power of dominant groups, as critical race theorists have done,
implies negative and anti-Semitic views about these groups’ success).
174. See supra notes 77–83 (asserting that Reagan’s policies were hostile towards
Blacks but were largely embraced by the electorate).
175. Lott was forced to step down as Senate Majority Leader after remarking that
if America had elected Senator Strom Thurmond as President in 1948, it “wouldn’t
have had all these problems.” Charles Babington, Lott Rejoins Senate Leadership: In
Comeback Mississippian Is Elected GOP Whip over Alexander, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006,
at A4. Thurmond had run on a segregationist platform in 1948. Id. Four years after
Lott’s resignation, the Republican caucus elected Lott Minority Whip, the party’s
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demonstrated a leniency toward anti-Black dispositions that has no
176
parallel in their processing of controversial speech by Blacks. Thus,
the condemnation of Louis Farrakhan and one of his lieutenants,
Khallid Abdul Muhammad, for alleged anti-Semitic remarks was such
a cause célèbre that none other than Congress itself intervened to
177
censure them.
Yet no censure was in order for a United States
178
Senator’s public embrace of segregation.
A venerated civil rights
leader, Andrew Young, was roundly criticized not for the inaccuracy
of his statements about groups that have exploited Blacks
economically but rather for having the temerity to make these
179
observations publicly.
Meanwhile, the publication of scholarship
second-highest post in the Senate. Id. “Lott’s feat ranks among the more impressive
political comebacks of recent times.” Id.
176. The (temporary) demise of White shock-jock Don Imus does not belie this
point. Despite an American preoccupation with celebrity that borders on frivolity,
Imus’s on-air racial insult of the Black women of a college basketball team does not
compare to the direct, tangible harm inflicted by the policies of President Reagan or
Trent Lott. Indeed, the danger in allowing Whites to assuage their collective racial
conscience by condemning racial insult is that “we’re reinforcing this notion that
[racial insult is] all that racism is.” David Alexander, Imus Firing Should Not End Race
Debate: Experts, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUS
N1344138620070413?pageNumber=3&sp=true (quoting Darren Hutchinson,
Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law).
177. See Clarence Page, Doing the ‘White’ Thing on Capitol Hill, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20,
1999, at 19 (noting the congressional vote to censure Farrakhan). Muhammad was
censured by the United States House of Representatives and Senate for a 1993
speech in which he referred to Jews as “bloodsuckers.” Jayson Blair, K.A. Muhammad,
53, Dies; Ex-Official of Nation of Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at 40.
178. Senator Carl Levin of Michigan introduced the motion to censure Louis
Farrakhan in the United States Senate. When asked whether he would introduce a
censure motion against Lott, he declined to do so unless it was done on a bipartisan
basis. Senators Rick Santorum and Carl Levin Discuss Iraq, the War on Terrorism, Trent
Lott, and the New Bush Economic Team, NBC News Transcripts, Meet the Press, Dec. 15,
2002. Levin, a Democrat, would not even call for Lott to step down as Senate
Majority Leader. Id. His reticence to condemn White racism with the same vigor as
Black speech is not atypical. White Americans at times display a pathological craving
for inverting the prototype of American racism by purporting to demonstrate that
Blacks, too, are racists. Consider that nearly twenty years after Jesse Jackson’s
infamous “Hymietown” remark, the Boston City Council passed a resolution
condemning his use of the term. Scott S. Greenberger & Alice Gomstyn, Resolved:
That Councilors Never Forget, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2002, at B1. In juxtaposition to
this manic vigilance of Black speech, consider the Louisiana State Republican Party
Committee’s refusal to censure state Representative David Duke for his past
leadership of the Ku Klux Klan. Louisiana GOP Won’t Censure Duke, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
24, 1989, at 24. Whites’ psychological need to project their racism onto Black victims
has become so absurd that the eighty-year-old namesake of the only law school in
Rhode Island recently blamed his use of the term “nigger” during a university
trustees meeting on rap music. See Associated Press, R.I. School Official Resigns After
Slur, WashingtonPost.com, July 16, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/c
ontent/article/2007/07/16/AR2007071600808_pf.html (quoting Ralph Papitto’s
explanation of his use of the term: “The first time I heard it was on television and
then rap music or something”).
179. See, e.g., Cynthia Tucker, Opinion, Stereotypes Fester—Thanks Even to Young,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 27, 2006, at A6. Along with many other editorial-page
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proposing that Black applicants not be admitted to elite law schools
180
The
has been feted as worthy of intellectual exploration.
boundaries for legitimate discourse are different for speakers of
different races, depending on the race and social positions of those
about whom they speak and of those evaluating the speech. As one
commentator lamented after observing the nation’s preoccupation
with Farrakhan’s speeches as compared with its laxity toward White
neo-Nazi militia groups associated with the Oklahoma City bombings,
“it is far easier for Americans to censure blacks than whites, even
181
when the infractions are of different orders of magnitude.”
The attempt here, as it has been in all the narratives used, is not to
justify Jeffries’s incipient speech, but rather to demonstrate that his
social inequality as a racial minority and the social dominance of
those evaluating his speech likely interacted to distort the discourse.
Whether current First Amendment doctrine accounts for the
operation of and attempts to neutralize these social inequities is the
next inquiry.

editors, Tucker criticized Young for defending Wal-Mart’s practice of driving
neighborhood shops out of business. Young argued that many of these shops
provided poor services to Black communities and observed: “Those are the people
who have been overcharging us—selling us stale bread and bad meat and wilted
vegetables. . . . I think they’ve ripped off our communities enough. First it was Jews,
then it was Koreans, and now it’s Arabs. Very few blacks own these stores.” Id.
Without any factual refutation of Young’s assertions, Tucker, who is Black, reflexively
decried his comments as “bigotry.” Id.
I addressed rhetorical moves like Tucker’s in my own editorial concerning
Young’s comments:
There’s a familiar pattern here. A black public figure criticizes a particular
ethnic group such as Jews, and his sin of specification, rather than the
substance of his charge, becomes the focus of public attention. It’s the racial
equivalent of wag the dog, a perfect deflection of the public’s attention from
the real, more serious issue. And a black public official is the perfect foil
because his perceived gaffe dilutes the moral legacy of black people as
victims of exploitation by virtually every ethnic group in the United States,
including Jews, Koreans and Arabs.
Posting of Terry Smith to Blackprof.com, Andy Young’s Truth, America’s Blues,
http://www.blackprof.com/?p=1588 (Aug. 20, 2006).
180. See Adam Litak, For Blacks in Law School, Can Less Be More?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2005, at 3 (reporting on a study by Professor Richard Sander that purported to
demonstrate that admitting Black students to less prestigious law schools, rather than
elite ones, would increase the number of Black lawyers). Blacks are all too common
fodder for studies like that authored by Sander, which, to be sure, may rely on data
but also on “inference and speculation.” Id. And unlike the flight from substance
and knee-jerk condemnations provoked by controversial speech from Blacks,
Sander’s work has been engaged on its own terms. See id. (“His critics generally
accept, and sometimes even praise, aspects of his empirical work.”).
181. Nell Irvin Painter, Editorial, Hate Speech in Black and White, BALT. SUN, May 8,
1995, at 9A.
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II. ACCOUNTING FOR INEQUALITY: THE LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT
DOCTRINE
The interaction of social inequality with free speech rights is a
vexing concern that neither courts nor academics have quelled.
Owing to the First Amendment’s strongly individualist tradition and
equal protection’s countervailing pedigree of concern for group
subordination, the jurisprudence outside the employment context
182
has been bifurcated with little mutual accommodation.
But the
tension between equality and expression engaged by the scholarship
183
of Professor Nan Hunter and others is one that is only partially
permutated in the public employment context. For one thing, the
requirement that an employee’s speech be on a matter of public
concern, and the reduced protection for speech that primarily
implicates the employee’s idiosyncratic interests, dilutes the
individual-versus-group dichotomy that underpins the broader First
Amendment debate. Under the Pickering/Connick construct, in order
to receive protection, the employee becomes a de facto spokesman
for other individuals in the community or workplace who share his
point of view. Nonetheless, the critical insight contributed by this
body of scholarship is a need for an identity-sensitive First
Amendment jurisprudence, in which the social inequality of the
speaker is incorporated into the analysis rather than ignored.
Outside the employment context, the goals of social equality and
free expression have clashed where one group has attempted to
exclude another from its activities because it objects to the excluded
group’s viewpoint. Hunter uses as a paradigm Hurley v. Irish-American
184
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which parade organizers
185
While
were permitted to exclude pro-homosexual advocates.
Hunter’s frame of reference (i.e., one organization excluding
members of another) is factually distinguishable from the
employment setting, the conceptual underpinning of her argument is

182. See Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Antiorthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1686 (2000) (“Individualism supplied
the cultural meaning of the First Amendment and became indelibly associated with
the nation’s keystone freedom.”); id. at 1690 (“By contrast to the mobility intrinsic to
the jurisprudence of expression, the jurisprudence of equality has grown into a
dependence on the fixity of identity, a doctrinal form of immobility.”).
183. Id. at 1712 (citing Steven Shiffrin, The Amendment and the Meaning of America,
in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 307 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1995)).
184. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
185. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000).
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germane: “[S]peech performs identity.” That is, social identity for
certain sub-populations is constructed through their dissent from the
mainstream, or as Hunter puts it, from a unique “point of
187
view(ing) . . . .” The imbricate stories relayed in Part I demonstrate
how the dissenting speech of the minority actor contributes to
disadvantageous perceptions of him, particularly when the speech is
oppositional to racism or a prevailing societal ukase that reflects
racial divides. Hunter strives to create a conceptual framework for
188
accommodating equality and speech claims. The backdrop for the
discourse in the employment context, however, is a more
rudimentary argument about which level of scrutiny employee free
speech claims are entitled to. In the sections that follow, I first
discuss the courts’ general refusal to apply strict scrutiny to free
speech claims by public sector employees, underscoring the especial
disadvantage that this practice poses for minority plaintiffs whose
speech is referential to their social inequality. I then discuss the
limited and inadequate role that courts have permitted equal
protection to play in public employee speech cases and why equal
protection doctrine is unlikely to fill the First Amendment’s void in
protecting socially unequal speakers such as racial minorities. Finally,
I revisit in some detail the rationale of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which the Court further eroded the
protections available to public employee free speech and thus
reduced the First Amendment’s ability to neutralize social inequality
among speakers.
A. Mapping the Doctrinal Present: Avoiding Strict Scrutiny
Courts generally do not apply strict scrutiny to the content-based
189
restrictions placed on employee speech by government employers.
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 12. Hunter writes:
Expressive identity theory envisions expression and equality as a continuum,
rather than a dichotomy. It embodies two components that can never be
fully disaggregated. As a result, identity becomes less fixed, less easy to
define, classify, or contain, a development that could reinvigorate equal
protection jurisprudence. A theory of expressive identity differs from
identity politics because this unruliness arises not solely from the concept of
difference, but also from that of dissent. Expressive identity marks the
juncture where equality claims can successfully incorporate point-ofview(ing) rationales. Theorizing expressive identity seeks to recuperate
dissent for equality.
Id.
188. See id. at 20 (proposing a three-step doctrinal inquiry).
189. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1141–42 (2005); see
Alexandra Gruber & Barbara Kritchevsky, The Uneasy Coexistence of Equal Protection and
Free Speech Claims in the Public Employment Context, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 559, 587–88
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The variegated intermediate-level scrutiny courts do apply results in
upholding speech restrictions on government workers “for reasons
that would not suffice if the same restrictions were imposed on
190
others.” The level of constitutional scrutiny almost certainly affects
the courts’ ability to account for the social inequality of an employee
191
penalized for his speech.
Lower courts seldom explicate the jurisprudential reasons for the
application of intermediate scrutiny; they simply note that the
Supreme Court’s Pickering/Connick balancing test amounts to
192
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court,
however, has made clear its twin concerns that the government
193
employer not be prevented from running an efficient shop and,
concomitantly, that government employees not enjoy free speech

(2001) (noting that public employee speech receives “far less First Amendment
protection than the average citizen”).
190. Fee, supra note 189, at 1141–42; United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (“Congress may impose restraints on the job-related
speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the
public at large.”).
191. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(explicitly rejecting strict scrutiny and instead applying Pickering/Connick balancing
to government applicant’s claim that the withdrawal of her job offer as a staff
attorney in the Georgia Attorney General’s office was based on her lesbian
“marriage” and that such action violated her First Amendment associational rights).
The Eleventh Circuit credited the State Attorney General’s concerns over the
public’s perception of a state lawyer symbolically defying Georgia’s non-recognition
of same-sex marriages and the possible conflicts of interest that the plaintiff may have
in gay rights cases, such as those banning sodomy, in which Georgia had already
been and was likely to again be a defendant. Id. at 1104–07. Georgia had, for
instance, been the defendant in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overturned by
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). The circuit court concluded that the
attorney general’s concerns outweighed the plaintiff’s associational interests. Id. at
1110.
192. E.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1037 (6th Cir. 2003); Shahar, 114 F.3d
at 1102–03; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 3803 v. Kan. City, 220 F.3d
969, 973–74 (8th Cir. 2000) (adapting Pickering/Connick intermediate scrutiny to a
public employee’s First Amendment associational claim).
Even where courts have attempted to provide a rationale for applying
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, their logic has amounted to little more than
a tautology. For instance, in Kansas City, the court rejected the application of strict
scrutiny because of the “distinction between Kansas City’s role as a sovereign and the
government’s role as an employer.” 220 F.3d at 973. Although the government’s
differing roles might give rise to different interests to be weighed, it does not explain
why a lesser constitutional standard should be applied to those interests. See Knight
v. Conn. Dep’t of Publ. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (providing a
similarly circular rationale for the application of intermediate scrutiny to a hybrid
speech-association claim).
193. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (“The government’s interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it
acts as employer.”).
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rights incongruous with private sector employees where the former’s
194
speech does not implicate matters of public concern.
Recent critiques of heightened scrutiny by legal scholars raise
195
concerns about its salutary nature.
Yet strict scrutiny’s potency is
relative and can only be appreciated in relation to lesser standards of
review, in this instance Pickering/Connick balancing. One can
plausibly imagine a different outcome for Professor Leonard Jeffries
had this nebulous balancing test been replaced by strict scrutiny’s
requirement that the government demonstrate a narrowly tailored
compelling interest before disciplining Jeffries for his speech by
demoting him as chair of the Black Studies Department at the City
196
University of New York (“CUNY”).
Instead, the Second Circuit,
interpreting Supreme Court precedent, held that the university need
not show the actual disruptiveness of Jeffries’s speech; it was sufficient
under Pickering/Connick balancing that the government “make a
197
substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive.”
This standard allowed the university to speculate about the
harmfulness of Jeffries’s speech without confronting how the relative
social inequality of Jeffries vis-à-vis his critics may have infected any
198
assessment of disruption.
Strict scrutiny would have required the
199
The more
university to move beyond hypothetical concerns.
demanding evidentiary predicate would not have required “an
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption
of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest
200
before taking action,” for the exigent circumstances necessitating
194. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“Our responsibility is to
ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for
the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances
not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the State.”).
195. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1534 (2004) (arguing that “heightened scrutiny” of
classifications based on sexual orientation—a regimen effectuated by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)—will paradoxically lead to greater governmental
scrutiny of gay conduct); Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional
Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 209–11 (2005) (using historical examples to
illustrate that “strict scrutiny may be susceptible to skewing effects or manipulation in
times of crisis”).
196. Jeffries v. Harleson, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
197. Id. at 13 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994)). Waters held that
the speech for which a public employer disciplines an employee need not be the
employee’s actual speech so long as the employer reasonably concludes that the
employee made the remarks at issue. 511 U.S. at 667.
198. See infra notes 233–248 and accompanying text (prescribing a framework for
detecting the effect of social inequality).
199. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
Georgia’s allegedly race-based redistricting plan and requiring a “strong basis in
evidence” that the plan was necessary to cure the effects of past discrimination).
200. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
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prompt action by the government is one factor to be taken account of
201
In
in determining whether it possesses a compelling interest.
Jeffries’s circumstances in particular, because Jeffries remained a
tenured professor and because “the position of department chair at
CUNY is ministerial, and provides no greater public contact than an
202
ordinary professorship,” strict scrutiny would not have undermined
the Supreme Court’s purported concerns with efficiency and
workplace stability. What strict scrutiny would have likely achieved,
however, is a more probing inquiry into the university’s claims of
disruption and, ultimately, a different result.
Whatever the deficiencies of strict scrutiny review, they pale in
comparison to the vagaries and lopsidedness of Pickering/Connick
balancing. Cases such as Jeffries suggest that in order to neutralize the
social inequality of the speaker in assessing the constitutional
protection his speech is due, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
must elevate the First Amendment standard for all public employee
speech. To the extent that the current jurisprudence is lacking
generally, it may disproportionately vitiate protection for the speech
of racial minorities when these employees’ speech violates Whitesanctioned workplace norms.
B. Mapping the Doctrinal Present: The Limitations of Equal Protection
Because strict scrutiny will not generally be applied to public
employees’ First Amendment free speech claims, employees have rearticulated such claims under the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The objective of this relocation
is to obtain under the fundamental rights prong of equal protection
203
what Pickering/Connick balancing denies them: strict scrutiny.
Where the equal protection claim is predicated on the public
employee’s exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights, courts
have generally rejected the claim as repetitive of the free speech
204
claim. Thus, in the archetypal public employee free speech case in

201. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972) (permitting the government to
abrogate the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard
before seizing private property where there is “a special need for very prompt
action”).
202. Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 14.
203. Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 586–87.
204. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir.
1990) (determining that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim based
on the exercise of his free speech rights where plaintiff cannot point to others who
exercised such rights for purposes of determining unequal treatment). Gruber and
Kritchevsky conclude that the approach taken in these cases is correct:
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which the claim of unequal treatment is undifferentiated from the
free speech claim, the Equal Protection Clause has demonstrated no
greater capacity to neutralize the social inequality of the speaker than
has the First Amendment.
The variations on the uses of equal protection in conjunction with
free speech claims present ameliorative possibilities that are more
theoretical than real. Each of the public employees in the narratives
of Part I, for instance, could claim classification or status
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause based on his or her
205
race or nationality.
But race-based status discrimination claims
206
Where speech and listeners’
suffer a quite low rate of success.
reactions thereto are proxies for race—as they are in the foregoing
narratives—the very subtlety of the interaction of speech and race
frustrates, if not dooms, an already disadvantaged status claim.
Rather than relying on his status, a speaker could allege content or
viewpoint discrimination—that is, he could allege that an employer
punished him for his speech on a particular subject or for advocating
The situation is different . . . when the plaintiff claims that the only basis on
which he was treated differently was his exercise of First Amendment rights.
Most lower courts have properly found that plaintiffs in these cases do not
state equal protection claims. This result is correct because the plaintiff’s
allegation in these cases is simply that the employer erred in treating him
differently from other employees because he exercised his right to speak.
The question is whether the employer had the right to treat him differently
for speaking. That is the precise question for which the Court developed the
Pickering-Connick analysis.
Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 601 (footnotes omitted).
Even where lower courts have recognized an equal protection claim predicated
on an employee’s exercise of his free speech rights, they have eschewed the use of
strict scrutiny out of similar overlap concerns as those courts that have refused to
recognize the equal protection claim. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of
Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding the employee’s equal protection
claim based on the exercise of his free speech but declining to use fundamental
rights analysis, which would apply strict scrutiny, because plaintiff constituted only a
class of one). While the Scarbrough court recognized the Supreme Court’s holding in
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), that equal protection claims
can be brought by a class of one, it declined to apply Olech to fundamental rights
analysis because to do so “would allow the Equal Protection Clause to render other
constitutional provisions superfluous.” 470 F.3d at 261.
205. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 594 (“[T]he lower courts have
consistently allowed public employees to state claims that invoke the classification
strand of equal protection law, claims in which employees allege that they were
discriminated against based on class membership, in addition to First Amendment
claims.”).
206. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558–60 (2001) (citing statistics and noting that “plaintiffs in
employment discrimination suits generally fare worse than most other kinds of civil
plaintiffs”); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 912 (2005) (“The state of employment discrimination
practice can be easily summarized: plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they
file except for a few isolated ones, most notably sexual harassment claims.”).
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a particular viewpoint but did not discipline others who similarly
207
Although nonexercised their First Amendment rights.
208
employment cases such as R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul establish that
governmental favoritism in the proscription of speech that the
government is otherwise entitled to prohibit will be subject to strict
209
scrutiny, the public sector employee faces two immediate difficulties
in pursuing an equal protection claim on this basis. First, the claim
requires a comparator. The employee who merely claims that he was
punished for exercising his First Amendment rights while those who
did not speak were spared discipline must rely on the
Pickering/Connick test, which provides a reduced standard of judicial
210
review. Moreover, the equal protection claimant must show that he
was “similarly situated” to those who did exercise their rights and
were not disciplined. Within a White-dominated workplace that
tacitly incorporates societal norms, these criteria are problematic.
Two commentators provide an example through which the
complications can be explored. According to Alexandra Gruber and
Barbara Kritchevsky, “an employee who speaks of ‘black power’ and
an employee who speaks of ‘white power’ would be similarly situated,
even if the ‘white power’ expression had more of a disruptive effect
211
on the work environment.” A preference by an employer for either
212
viewpoint should receive strict scrutiny.
Yet things are not so simple in the economy of racialization in the
workplace. First, racial identity is a defining characteristic in most
African Americans’ lives in a manner that it is not in the lives of
White Americans precisely because, as the socially dominant group,
207. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 598–99 (listing cases where
alleged viewpoint discrimination occurred). “Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an
egregious form of content discrimination,” the latter being directed at the subject
matter of the speech, the former at the particular view taken on a subject.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).
208. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
209. See id. at 395–96 (applying strict scrutiny to a hate-crimes ordinance that
singled out certain fighting words—i.e., speech expressing racial hostility—but
permitted other expressions that the government was likewise capable of
proscribing—i.e., the expression of hostility on the basis of homosexuality).
210. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 601 (noting that lower courts
have denied the equal protection claim and applied Pickering/Connick balancing to
these circumstances because “[t]he question [in the equal protection claim] is
whether the employer had the right to treat him differently for speaking. That is the
precise question for which the Court developed the Pickering-Connick analysis.”). But
see Kantha v. Blue, 262 F. Supp. 2d 90, 107–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suggesting that a
speech-based equal protection claim might survive where plaintiff can show that
similarly situated employees “who did not complain about Blue’s conduct, were
treated differently” from her).
211. Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 609.
212. Id. at 610.
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Whites “have the option to set aside consciousness of the
213
characteristic that defines the dominant class—in this case, race.”
Despite their consciousness of race and its centrality to their identity,
214
in a culture of White meta-privilege, people of color necessarily
engage in self-censorship in their discussions with Whites. African
Americans are more likely to engage each other in discussions about
Whites and racism and are more likely to restrict discussions with
215
Whites to more pedestrian topics.
These dynamics curtail the
efficacy of content or viewpoint discrimination claims because, first,
people of color do not as a practical matter enjoy the same
opportunity of expression as Whites in a White-dominated workplace;
and second, the search for comparators for a minority employee who
does engage in identity speech will likely be hampered by the
reduced need of Whites to engage in such speech.
A minority employee’s content or viewpoint discrimination claim is
further complicated by judicial vagaries in determining who is a
216
similarly situated employee and by an apparent insistence on a
showing of intentional conduct, even when the employee is not
complaining of status-based or class-based discrimination. The
Second Circuit’s articulation of the applicable standards is illustrative
of both these hurdles:
In establishing the similarly-situated element, we have warned that
“the level of similarity between plaintiffs and the person with whom
they compare themselves must be extremely high.” A plaintiff must
show that (1) “no rational person could regard the circumstances
of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree
that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a
legitimate government policy; and [(2)] the similarity in
circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude
217
the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.”
213. Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2035 (1995).
214. See Barbara J. Flagg, Foreward: Whiteness as Metaprivilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (defining Whiteness as an ultimate privilege because “Whiteness
sets the terms on which racial identity is constructed”).
215. HECHT ET AL., supra note 104, at 110.
216. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 636 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To
prove discriminatory effect, the plaintiffs are required to show that they are members
of a protected class, that they are otherwise similarly situated to members of the
unprotected class, and that plaintiffs were treated differently from members of the
unprotected class.”) (internal citations omitted).
217. Skehan v. The Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted); see Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.
2006) (requiring that an equal protection plaintiff show selective treatment with an
“intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights”) (internal citation
omitted); Morron v. City of Middletown, 464 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Conn. 2006)

572

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:523

Judicial insistence on exacting verisimilitude between speech
comparators undermines the salutary effect of escaping the strictures
of the Pickering/Connick test. Moreover, the indirect requirement of
an intent to harm—as expressed by the allowance of a mistake
defense—ignores prevailing social science that demonstrates that
bias, whether against status or speech, need not be motivational but
218
instead often arises from unconscious cognitive processes.
Thus,
while content or viewpoint discrimination is perhaps the best
judicially recognized means of accounting for inequality in workplace
speech, it is far from sufficient.
C. Mapping the Doctrinal Present: Garcetti’s Invitation to Discrimination
219

Garcetti v. Ceballos further etiolates a First Amendment employee
jurisprudence in which all employees may have too little protection
but where this insufficiency abets racial inequality in the workplace,
affording the minority employee still less protection. Imagine that
Ceballos, described in Part I as a conscientious public servant rather
than a racial meliorist, did engage in identity politics. That is, he
brought to bear in a relevant fashion his cultural perspective on a
work issue—here, the question of a sheriff deputy’s dishonesty in
submitting an affidavit.
Because Garcetti categorically permits
employer sanction of speech made pursuant to an employee’s official
job duties, Ceballos’s culturally imbued perspective on the question
of the sheriff deputy’s dishonesty can now be pretextually
discriminated against with impunity. A savvy public employer, of
course, would not announce the biases that inform its sanction of
Ceballos’s speech, nor for that matter need the employer even be
cognizant of its biases. Under such circumstances, equal protection
doctrine is highly unlikely to pick up the First Amendment’s slack.
The per se approach of Garcetti encourages unremediable content
discrimination, discrimination that amounts to racial discrimination
where the disciplined minority employee has intertwined his racial
inequality with his speech.

(“[P]laintiff cannot prevail absent prima facie showing that he is identical in all
relevant respects to the individuals with whom he compares himself.”); Cooper v.
Smith, 855 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (dismissing an equal protection claim
on narrow construction of similarly situated requirement because the plaintiff could
not point to “other employees [who] publicly expressed distaste for their jobs and
their superiors”).
218. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (explaining that a person may
be completely unaware that he is stereotyping a coworker or an event).
219. 126 S. Ct. 1955 (2006).
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Garcetti’s per se approach is justifiable from neither a practical nor
a constitutional standpoint. The twenty-first century has ushered in
the most diverse workforce in United States history. With work as the
220
most significant sphere of interracial and inter-cultural exchange,
its potential as an agent for distancing the nation from its
221
Yet scholars of organizational
discriminatory past is considerable.
behavior caution that workplace diversity can brew dysfunctionality
and conflict where employers and workers conceive diversity in
homogenizing rather than operationally pluralistic terms. Professor
David A. Thomas of the Harvard Business School and Professor Robin
Ely studied the interactions of workers and management in three
racially diverse work settings, but found that the productivity and
harmony of the groups varied with their conception of diversity:
When a work group views cultural differences among its members
as an important resource for learning how best to accomplish its
core work, group members can negotiate expectations, norms, and
assumptions about work in service of their goals, and conflicts that
arise are settled by a process of joint inquiry. . . . In work groups in
which it is legitimate for group members to bring all of their
relevant knowledge and experience to bear on the core work of the
group—including knowledge and experience linked to their
cultural identity—members are more likely to feel valued and
respected in the group and to receive more validation for their
cultural self-identities. . . . This heightens group members’ feelings
of effectiveness . . . and motivation to achieve. . . . By contrast, when
a work group views cultural differences as having the potential to
make only a marginal or negative contribution to work, the
dominant cultural group likely defines prevailing expectations,
norms, and assumptions about work, and conflicts, if not
suppressed, are settled by power. . . . This impedes learning and
222
limits members’ sense of self- and group efficacy.

Thus, for all of its professed concerns with efficiency in the
government workplace, the Court in Garcetti fails to grapple with the
workplace of the twenty-first century, in which dissent must be
managed as an integral and healthy by-product of diversity in order
for racially heterogeneous workplaces to prosper. There is far less
220. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:
HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 3 (2003) (“[O]f all the places where adults
interact with others, the workplace is likely to be the most demographically
diverse.”).
221. See id. at 11 (“A significant body of empirical research on intergroup relations
confirms that cooperative interaction of the sort that often happens at work tends to
produce more positive attitudes and relations across ethnic and racial lines.”).
222. David A. Thomas & Robin Ely, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 266–67 (2001).
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incentive for the government employer to engage in best
management practices, however, where the Court has licensed it to
cleanse the workplace of divergent viewpoints when they are
expressed as part of the employee’s formal duties. Although a private
employer might eschew such a heavy-handed approach for fear of the
inefficiencies it may create, “a public employer, unlike his private
counterpart, is not guided by the profit motive and constrained by
223
the normal operation of the market.”
The majority in Garcetti attempted to leaven the harshness of its
rule by suggesting that employers will voluntarily encourage the kind
of exchanges that its decision makes punishable and by pointing to
other statutory protections for employees, such as federal and state
224
whistle-blower laws. This maneuver, however, only underscored the
constitutionally antiquated nature of the majority’s rule. Whistleblower statutes evince an emerging societal consensus that speech
such as Ceballos’s that seeks to expose governmental malfeasance
should be protected. The Court has recognized the relevance of
society’s “emerging awareness” and “emerging recognition” of the
contours of constitutional liberty in its substantive due process
225
cases. Although it has applied a different analysis to cases asserting
226
an infraction of a liberty that is enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
the Court has not analyzed such rights wholly without reference to
227
social understandings.
For instance, in determining whether a
public employer was justified in searching the office of an employee,
the Court has asked as a threshold inquiry whether the employee has
“an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
228
reasonable.”

223. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227 (1977) (discussing
private sector/public sector difference in the context of collective bargaining
agreement agency shop arrangements).
224. 126 S. Ct. at 1953.
225. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (asserting that people are to
be afforded substantial protection in matters pertaining to sex).
226. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing the right of intimate association protected by substantive
due process from the right of expressive association protected by the First
Amendment); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(demarcating the broad concept of liberty encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause from specific rights contained in the Bill of
Rights); Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1521 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing
between substantive due process analysis and violations of the Bill of Rights).
227. See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1, 7 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is in
essential respects the “mirror image[]” of its substantive due process analysis).
228. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987).
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Different enumerated rights may require a different weighting of
societal norms, especially where a counter-majoritarian liberty such as
the First Amendment is invoked.
Nevertheless, given the
considerable extent to which the Court in Garcetti focused on the
government employer’s interests, it is not unreasonable to attempt to
ascertain employees’ understandings of fair workplace speech
parameters. In a different parlance, what is the “psychological
contract” between workers and employers regarding workplace
229
speech?
It is most unlikely that Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in
Garcetti, reasonably expected to be subject to discipline for exposing
potential mendacity by a deputy sheriff. Most workers feel at liberty
to express views that differ from their employer’s on even a highly
230
controversial subject like the invasion of Iraq.
Moreover, most do
231
not believe the expression of such views will derogate productivity.
If workers expect that employers will act in good faith where the
workplace speech is unrelated to the mission of the organization,
they would indeed be surprised to find that speech “made pursuant
to their official duties,” when not otherwise disruptive, was per se
232
unprotected.
D. Summary: Does the First Amendment Account for the Social Inequality of
the Speaker?
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that while all public
employee speech enjoys some protection under the First Amendment
or a combination of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
229. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications
of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 550
(2001) (explaining that the psychological contract between the employee and
employer includes their varying perceptions, beliefs, and interpretations with regard
to workplace interaction).
230. See Work Life During Wartime: Tensions, Anxiety, Risks of Discrimination Invade the
Workplace, 21 HUMAN RESOURCES REPORT (BNA, INC.) 341, 341 (2003) (reporting the
results of a survey conducted by the Employment Law Alliance which found that 89%
of workers believed that they could express a view on the Iraq War that differed from
their boss’).
231. Id.
232. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to
a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 158 (2007) (suggesting a due
process resolution to cases like Garcetti).
When the government employer directs or encourages employees, as part of
their job, to exercise and express their judgment or to disclose wrongdoing
on matters of public concern, it implicitly promises them that they will not
be subject to reprisals for doing so in a conscientious manner. . . . That
implied contractual limitation on employer discretion should give rise to a
limited property interest in employment and a right under the Due Process
Clause to an impartial hearing . . . .
Id.
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Clause, these protections are overly porous. When race is added as a
differentiating characteristic among speakers, these protections
become even more hollow because the courts’ inquiry into the
workplace discourse is generally limited to intermediate rather than
strict scrutiny. This standard of constitutional review has obviously
not prevented some public sector employees, both Black and White,
from prevailing. Ardith McPherson’s narrow triumph is testament to
this. Yet these successes do not speak to the cases that fall through
the cracks, like Jeffries.
The application of strict scrutiny would go far in addressing the
interference of social inequality with the protection of workplace
speech. But advocating the application of strict scrutiny is mainly
precatory. Pickering/Connick balancing is well ingrained in the fabric
of First Amendment jurisprudence, and the Court’s posture in
Garcetti suggests an inclination to restrict rather than expand the First
Amendment regimen. The need to account for social inequalities
among speakers must thus not only contend with, but ultimately
dovetail with, these realities. It is to this task that the final section of
this Article now turns.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR INEQUALITY INCREMENTALLY
Garcetti v. Ceballos’s artificial distinction between speech made
pursuant to an employee’s official duties and speech made as a
citizen on the job increased the frailty of a free speech jurisprudence
that already fails to adequately protect socially unequal speakers. Yet
233
in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, decided
during the same term as Garcetti, the Court demonstrated an
appreciation for the subtle ways in which speech can be suppressed
and punished. This understanding is germane to any effort to
dissipate the effects of social inequality in the exercise of free speech.
Although the First Amendment and Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision differ in reference to the right at issue, I contrast Garcetti
and Burlington Northern below to illuminate the two very different
views of workplace discourse that the Court harbored in the same
term. I then employ the broader teachings of Burlington Northern to
re-litigate Garcetti.

233. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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A. Burlington Northern as a Superior Approach
Like Ardith McPherson, Sheila White’s journey to the Supreme
Court began as a result of her speech. Unlike McPherson, White’s
speech was about the discrimination she encountered as the lone
234
female in her department. White, a Black woman who operated a
forklift for a private employer, complained of harassment to her
supervisor and filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
235
Employment Opportunity Commission.
Each action was met
236
punitively by agents of the defendant, Burlington Northern.
As a
result, White filed suit under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,
which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
237
employment practice by [Title VII].”
Regardless of the differences between the sources of the rights, any
protection of speech will raise common concerns. Principal among
these concerns are the chilling effects of employer actions on the
exercise of the speech right. Relatedly, free speech rights must be
attuned to the dynamics of the range of interactions in which the
protected speech may take place. The Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern was tasked with deciding which employer actions qualify as
238
prohibited retaliation under Title VII, implicating both foregoing
concerns. In deciding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
extended beyond so-called ultimate employment decisions such as
terminations and pay cuts, the Court was cognizant of the subtleties
that can characterize workplace discourse: “The real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
239
performed.”
With this recognition in mind, the Court avoided the kind of
categorical rule it announced in Garcetti, refusing to delineate specific
prohibited retaliatory acts, and instead broadly holding that an act is
retaliatory if “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from
240
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”
The Court in
Burlington Northern refused to eliminate whole categories of
234. Id. at 2409.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2411.
238. Id. at 2410.
239. Id. at 2415 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 81–82 (1998)).
240. Id.
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potentially chilling employer actions because it recognized that
context matters. Yet in Garcetti, the Court may have eliminated from
First Amendment protection entire categories of workplace speech
made pursuant to an employee’s official duties without any regard for
the context in which that speech occurs. Garcetti’s approach,
narrowly construed, calcifies the inadequacies of a First Amendment
doctrine that perpetuates social inequalities in the workplace. By
contrast, Burlington Northern’s sensitivity to context, if transported into
First Amendment jurisprudence, could offset not only Garcetti’s
inattention to context but also some of the disadvantages of the
courts’ general resistance to applying strict scrutiny to public
employee speech. To see how, let us re-litigate Garcetti, not under
Burlington Northern’s rule—for it is understood that Burlington Northern
was construing a specific statute—but rather using Burlington
Northern’s approach, which is apropos across a range of speech
protections.
B. Re-litigating Garcetti
Organizational behavior research confirms that workers do bring
to bear their cultural backgrounds in the performance of their work
241
duties.
Richard Ceballos’s own account of his motives in
questioning the veracity of a deputy sheriff suggests that workers may
not always be aware of the impact of their own cultural background
on their workplace conduct. Recall that there are in essence two
Ceballoses: pre-conscience, in which his Latino heritage played no
role in his decision, and post-conscience, in which the controversy
and penalty ensuing from his decision caused Ceballos to become
242
involved with a number of Latino legal organizations.
The postconscience Ceballos poses particular challenges for courts attempting
to apply the rule of Garcetti, for Ceballos, conscious of himself as a
Latino American prosecutor, represents W.E.B. Du Bois’s classic duality
of personhood for people of color: they are at once members of
241. See Thomas & Ely, supra note 222, at 257 (finding cultural identity to be a
“significant factor” shaping the performance of study subjects’ job duties in
employment settings that draw on employees’ cultural backgrounds as a source of
knowledge and insight); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279–93 (2000) (discussing the costs to minorities of adopting
workplace identities for the purpose of conforming to White workplace norms or
disabusing Whites of minority stereotypes); Flagg, supra note 213, at 2011–16
(illustrating through the now-famous example of “Keisha Akbar” how racial
background is brought to bear on the work performance of Black Americans and
proposing a Title VII remedy when employer policies discriminate against nonassimilating minorities without business necessity for doing so).
242. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (describing the activist role
taken by Ceballos as a Latino in the legal community).
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their cultural groups, which imbue their lives with unique and
indelible characteristics, and members of the broader American
243
community. When the former is brought to bear in the execution
of work duties, the minority American’s speech is indisputably speech
as a citizen, even if the speech coincides with speech that the
employee would otherwise make “pursuant to his employment
244
duties.”
The challenge for courts, and the opportunity for plaintiffs,
involves separating the duality that might accompany the workplace
speech of a person of color or any other social unequal. This is
where Burlington Northern’s lessons about context can have
consequential application in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Obviously, if speech of the same nature as the speech that was subject
to discipline takes place outside of work, the speech is not strictly
speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties and is
245
therefore not within the rule of Garcetti. But it is unlikely that most
employees will have occasion to use public venues for speaking about
work-related matters. Save for a highly visible public venue or
extraordinary efforts by an employer, it is equally unlikely that
employees could prove that an employer was aware of speech on
work-related matters that took place outside of work. Thus, the
prototype case involves the employee of color who speaks at work
pursuant to his official duties in the same manner he would speak as a
citizen. In short, the prototype is an employee of color who practices
243. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (Gramercy Books 1994)
(1903) (describing the African American state of being as a duality: “One ever feels
his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body. . . .”). Commentators have adapted
Du Bois’s classic construct to various other minority groups. See, e.g., Jean Shin, The
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (“An analogous kind of dividedness
may be observed in the case of Asian Americans—a division between the foreign
Asian and the assimilable Asian American.”).
244. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006); cf. Estlund, supra note 232,
at 152 (“[I]nternal employee dissent often emerge[s] from a deeply personal sense
of civic and moral obligation, not just the dutiful performance of the job one is paid
for.”).
245. The speech would thus be subject to traditional Pickering/Connick balancing,
unless its content placed it outside the parameters of public concern. See City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (ruling that off-the-job speech subject to
discipline is not entitled to balancing where speech exploits employer’s image but is
not a topic of “legitimate news interest”).
Ceballos made public statements about his controversy, specifically to the
Mexican American Bar Association. See First Amended Complaint, Ceballos v.
Garcetti, No. 00-11106 (C.D. Ca. filed Sept. 24, 2001). The Supreme Court
remanded the case to determine whether these statements formed part of the basis
for the actions against Ceballos. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. The case was settled
without judicial resolution of these claims. Telephone Interview with Richard
Ceballos, supra note 50.
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his duality in the workplace. The narrowest reading of Garcetti would
punish the exercise of this duality merely because it coincided with
the employee’s official duties. This constraint would have a uniquely
burdensome impact on those employees most likely to voice normviolational speech in the workplace, including employees of color.
Both Title VII and First Amendment jurisprudence have long
recognized that employers sometimes act with mixed motives, proper
246
and improper, in disciplining employees.
The same duality of
purpose that may motivate an employer can also account for an
employee’s speech.
Unless lower courts must engage in an
asymmetrical fiction in which employers can harbor mixed motives
but employees cannot, a more salutary reading of Garcetti would
permit an employee to demonstrate that the speech made pursuant
to his official duties was also made with the intent of speaking as a
citizen. Burlington Northern helps to define the full evidentiary scope
that should be available to an employee in meeting this burden.
Under this reading of Garcetti, the post-conscience Ceballos’s
founding of the Latino Prosecutors Association and his presidency of
the National Hispanic Prosecutors Association would be evidence of
an intent to speak beyond the dictates of his formal duties as a
prosecutor, for these affiliations suggest that Ceballos seeks to bring
to bear cultural viewpoints in the performance of his work.
To the extent that the post-conscience Ceballos voices views on the
job that are not in fulfillment of his official duties, but are
nonetheless related to duties that may arise in the future, this, too,
247
would be evidence of an intent to speak as a citizen. For instance,
let us suppose that Ceballos in casual conversation opined on the
facts of a case pending in a jurisdiction not his own. Suppose further
that those facts involved potential mendacity by a police affiant. If, as
a citizen, Ceballos expressed the same kind of skepticism about the
hypothetical police affiant’s conduct that he ultimately expressed in
his own case, the happenstance of being presented with similar facts
in the fulfillment of his own duties should not force him to suppress
246. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (determining that
under Title VII, “[w]hen . . . an employer considers both gender and legitimate
factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the
other, legitimate factors”); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977) (holding that the “District Court should have gone on to determine
whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to respondent’s reemployment even in the absence of
the protected conduct”).
247. Cf. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (distinguishing between speech relevant to the
subject matter of an employee’s job versus speech made pursuant to an employee’s
official duties).
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his views or place him at greater risk for punishment because now
those views are expressed as part of his duties. Instead, his prior
expressions should be allowed as some evidence of an intent to speak
248
as a citizen.
When an employer in a mixed-motive case has
demonstrated that it would have reached the same result even in the
absence of the improper motive, it prevails, at least as to monetary
249
damages.
The public employee who demonstrates that his speech
coincided with speech that he would ordinarily make as a citizen
would not prevail in his case but rather would advance his case to the
250
balancing stage of the Pickering/Connick test.
251
of Garcetti
One consequence of the contextual application
commended by Burlington Northern may be to encourage employees to
engage in a more explicit brand of identity politics in the workplace
248. The proposal I set forth here is superior to that of one commentator who has
sought to demarcate the line for First Amendment protection based on where the
speech is made, allowing employers broad latitude to punish on-the-job speech but
treating the speech as that of a citizen when it is directed to the public. Randy J.
Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1044–45 (2005).
First, Kozel’s prescription rests on the notion that “matters affecting the operations
of public service-providers are potentially matters of public interest . . . [, and]
encouraging employees to make their grievances public might well be desirable.” Id.
at 1045. Whatever the desirability of a public airing of internal office matters,
placing the onus of locating a public audience on the public employee as a condition
of receiving constitutional protection is both unfair and awkward. It is unfair
because unless an employer has restricted workplace speech only to matters
concerning work, much discussion that takes place in the workplace will resemble
that which takes place outside the workplace, yet Kozel’s construct would leave such
speech without protection. As Kozel concedes, under his proposal, Ardith
McPherson’s statements about President Ronald Reagan would likely be unprotected
unless she carried them outside the office and into “the public discourse.” Id. at
1046. Yet there was no policy in the Constable’s office prohibiting the private
discussion of political matters, and the attempt to impose any such policy in a nation
where the lines of work and private life blur out of practical necessity would be
Orwellian. See ESTLUND, supra note 220, at 119 (“Studies show that, when people are
asked with whom they discuss matters of importance, including politics, co-workers
figure as frequently as spouses, and more often than any other category of
nonrelatives.”).
Most importantly, Kozel’s proposal has little relation to how people communicate
in a multicultural workplace. Workers bring to bear their cultural perspectives on
their jobs, the very same perspectives that Kozel is apparently willing to protect as
long as they are kept out of the workplace. Kozel’s approach punishes those workers
who are most likely to challenge workplace norms with their cultural perspectives.
Any such outcome begs the question: why should prevailing norms, and those
willing to hew to them, be privileged in the workplace?
249. Under Title VII, an employer’s showing that it would have reached the same
result limits the employee’s remedy to declaratory and injunctive relief and
attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
250. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
251. Cf. Smith, supra note 36, at 566 (proposing a contextual, self-defense model
of opposition conduct under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision in which courts
would ask: “Would the totality of the employee’s experience with his employer cause
a reasonable employee of the same race to behave in the same fashion?”).
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in order to clearly demarcate speech as a citizen versus speech
pursuant to employment duties. A more pronounced identity politics
in the workplace will in turn bring the First Amendment’s policing of
social inequality into sharper relief. An employee such as Ceballos
would not be incentivized to downplay the racial dimension of his
questioning the veracity of a White police officer’s affidavit. Rather,
statements that are shown to be part of a continuum of an employee’s
authentic, independent race-consciousness would be insulated from
Garcetti’s reach but would still be subject to discipline if shown to be
252
unduly disruptive. This outcome is proper inasmuch as outspoken
employees of color bear a risk of intersectional discrimination arising
253
from both their status and speech that is referential to that status.
The broadening of the contextual inquiry for workplace speech
sanctioned by Burlington Northern ameliorates not only the rule of
Garcetti but also the broader overhang of intermediate scrutiny of
employee workplace speech. The “searching inquiry” of strict
scrutiny may be unattainable by Burlington Northern’s proxy, but
broadening the contextual inquiry will bring more precision to
Pickering/Connick balancing.
For instance, Richard Ceballos’s
attorneys did not pursue as a premise of their case the fact that his
superiors were more likely to be aggrieved by his questioning the
truthfulness of a police officer because one of them was married to

252. A public-sector employee who imports his race-consciousness into the
workplace should not be any more disadvantaged for doing so than the private-sector
employee who seeks protection under Title VII from work demands that violate his
religious tenets. No per se approach is used in the latter cases; rather, the inquiry
trains on reasonable accommodation. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S.
60, 69 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 78, 78 (1977). If the
practice of race-consciousness is overly disruptive to the workplace, the
Pickering/Connick framework, like its analog in the religion context, absolves the
employer of any obligation to tolerate the employee’s behavior.
253. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:
“Intersectionality,”
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307–08 (2001) (synthesizing the doctrinal pedigree of
intersectionality and related theories of discrimination: “[I]ntersectionality theory
provides a formidable challenge to the notion that scholars can adequately examine
or provide solutions to one form of subordination without analyzing how it is
affected and shaped by other systems of domination”). Although intersectionality
theory has largely focused on the confluence of multiple disadvantageous statuses in
shaping the experience of discrimination, I have previously set forth a comparable
theory in the context of protected speech under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
and race:
Race is simply not distinguishable from conduct opposing racism where, as
the psychological and medical evidence demonstrates, that opposition is
both a manifestation of racism’s harm and an effort to avoid further harm.
If this is true, then conduct that perpetuates racism cannot be treated
differently from conduct that punishes opposition to racism.
Smith, supra note 36, at 572.
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254

an officer. In Pickering/Connick balancing, once employee speech is
determined to be on a matter of public concern, the employer must
show that the speech was disruptive or had the potential for
disruption in order to justify disciplining the employee. Evidence of
personal bias on the part of the employer against the speech vitiates a
showing of disruption and instead suggests that objections to content
were the true reason for employer discipline.
Similarly, Ceballos could have established that the views he voiced
were more likely to subject him to discipline because they were
readily associated with the views of people of color and thus more
likely to cause his superiors to interpret those views through the
disadvantageous prisms that people of color are commonly seen and
heard. In making such an allegation, Ceballos need not have
brought an equal protection claim and suffered the disadvantages
attendant to that doctrine. As Burlington Northern intimates, a litigant
should not be foreclosed from establishing the factual background of
his speech and the responses thereto. Indeed, liberal rules of
pleading and discovery facilitate the full factual development and
255
presentation of a claim.
These facts may help courts to ascertain
256
In the context of
“the real social impact of workplace behavior.”
employee free speech and Pickering/Connick balancing, these
background facts are relevant to both the determination of whether
the speech is on a matter of public concern—hardly a culturally
neutral inquisition, as evidenced by Justice Scalia’s racially
257
stereotyped dissent in Rankin v. McPherson —and whether any
putative or actual disruptiveness of the speech is primarily the result
of its norm deviance or genuinely threatens the legitimate
operational concerns of the employer.
CONCLUSION
Disclaiming any connection between Ward Churchill’s 9/11
remarks and the allegations of research misconduct, the President of
the University of Colorado recommended Ward Churchill’s dismissal to

254. First Amended Complaint, Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. 00-11106 (C.D. Ca. filed
Sept. 24, 2001).
255. See, e.g., NAN D. HUNTER, THE POWER OF PROCEDURE: THE LITIGATION OF JONES
V. CLINTON 63–73 (2002) (detailing a crucial stage in Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657
(E.D. Ark. 1998), in which the district court allowed Jones to assert allegations
regarding President Clinton’s extramarital affairs “for the purpose of clarifying
plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights claims as far as proof at trial is concerned”).
256. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
257. See supra notes 97–110 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of a
speaker’s race on how his speech is interpreted).
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258

the university’s Board of Trustees.
The recommendation was
259
Churchill’s First Amendment
accepted, and Churchill was fired.
260
Its outcome, and the events
suit against the university is ongoing.
leading to it, underscore the peril for all public employee free
speech, for if the free exchange of ideas—especially provocative
ones—is not countenanced in the academic setting, they are surely
endangered elsewhere.
The most indelible lessons in the law are those that are personally
experienced. Reading about the litigants whose stories inform this
Article, and conversing with Ceballos and Churchill, caused me to
reflect deeply about how my own speech and that of millions of other
ordinary people of color is routinely placed under a racial
microscope. For private sector employees, most of whom are at-will,
the traditional regimen of antidiscrimination law does not purport to
address the intersection of speech and status that creates a unique
vulnerability to discrimination for the minority employee. But the
brooding presence of the First Amendment has not permitted the
minority public sector employee’s speech to escape the racial lens
either. This Article is a small contribution in the struggle to peel
back the lens, to permit people of color to speak unburdened by the
inequality of their status. To the dismay of some, and to the surprise
of others, I have insisted on this equality for my own speech.
Ceballos, McPherson, Jeffries, Churchill, and numerous other
courageous litigants of color fortify my determination.
Ward Churchill’s odyssey through the courts may well come to
define not merely the latest juncture in an evolving First Amendment
jurisprudence but to some degree, how free we remain as a people.
Change cannot occur without dissent, and the right of peaceful
dissent cannot be guarded if its parameters are drawn on the implicit
assumption that prevailing norms should be privileged.
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